The Authoritative Moment: Exploring the Boundaries of Interpretation in the Recognition of Queer Families by Franklin, Kris
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
2006
The Authoritative Moment: Exploring the
Boundaries of Interpretation in the Recognition of
Queer Families
Kris Franklin
New York Law School, kris.franklin@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Family Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
32 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 655 (2005-2006)
THE "AUTHORITATIVE MOMENT": EXPLORING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERPRETATION IN THE RECOGNITION
OF QUEER FAMILIES
Kris Franklint
I. INTRODUCTIO N ...................................................................... 655
A. The Interpretive Braid ....................................................... 661
B. A Word About Gay Marriage ............................................. 662
II. LEx REASONING IN QUEER FAMILY LAW CASES ..................... 664
111. FRAMING THE ISSUES: FACTUAL REASONING ......................... 673
A. Thinking By Analogy-The Power of Categories ................. 674
B. Thinking Laterally-Are Queer Families Like Straight
O nes? ............................................................................... 68 2
C. Thinking Sensibly-Avoiding Absurdity ............................ 688
IV. THE METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY .......................................... 695
A. Thinking About Rules; Thinking About Roles .................... 696
B. The Dance of Deference ...................................................... 702
V . C O NCLUSIO N ......................................................................... 713
I. INTRODUCTION
Pop quiz: What do all these cases have in common?
* A father dies intestate. His son claims that he is the
sole heir because the deceased man's wife is a
postoperative male-to-female transsexual, and hence
the marriage certificate issued by the State of Kansas is
invalid.'
* A husband sues for divorce on the grounds of adultery
because his wife has had an affair with another woman.
t Kris Franklin is a Professor of Law at New York Law School. Professor
Franklin wishes to thank the members of the N.Y. Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual &
Transexual Faculty Reading Group, together with the NYLS Junior Faculty
Colloquium, especially Seth Harris and Pamela Champine, for their insightful
comments on earlier drafts. And as always, her appreciation for Sarah E. Chinn,
whose help made this piece possible.
1. Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
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The woman insists that the divorce action must be
brought as a no-fault claim, because a same-sex
relationship does not qualify as adulterous under New
Hampshire law.2
* Two parents of the same sex are granted an order of
adoption in the District of Columbia. The child was
born in Virginia, which does not permit second-parent
adoption and explicitly prohibits legal recognition of
same-sex partnerships. The parents claim that the
State of Virginia is obliged, in accordance with the D.C.
court's order, to reissue the child's birth certificate,
3listing both of them as legal parents.
* A lesbian couple petitions for name changes so that
they may share a common surname. The New Jersey
trial court rejects their petition for fear that granting it
would inappropriately suggest that the women have a
partnership acknowledged under New Jersey law. The
women appeal, arguing that, barring deliberate fraud,
they should be permitted to change their names for
any reason they choose.4
While they are grounded in quite disparate bodies of law, all of
these cases ask the courts to think about the growing elasticity in
cultural understandings of families in the United States, and to
make decisions about where to draw the line in defining the
legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of different kinds of families. Indeed,
the question of what constitutes a family is perhaps one of the more
contentious that American culture has been asking itself in recent
decades.5 This question is not insignificant or simply technical-it
reaches into every corner of our personal, social, juridical,
financial, and religious lives, and generates any number of other
lines of inquiry. Which relationships are sanctioned by the state or
by religious institutions? How do we define who is a parent? Are
these changes in family forms genuinely new modes of human
relation or are they simply variations on pre-existing themes? What
is the connection between the health of the polity and the
2. In reBlanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010 (N.H. 2003).
3. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366 (Va. 2005).
4. In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
5. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY (Daniel Patrick Moynihan et al. eds.,
2004) (explaining that Americans are reexamining definitions of family and
assessing new family structures, primarily in a heterosexual context).
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narrowness or breadth of family definition?
An important component of (and often a catalyst to) this crisis
of definition has been the steady increase in cases dealing with
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) 6 people asserting
various family rights in the courts. Its most explosive manifestation
has been the fraught and sometimes vitriolic struggles over the
institution of marriage, and the possibility of extending the legal
rights of marriage to lesbian and gay couples. However, gay
marriage is only the most visible element of a variety of shifts within
family definition; along with struggles to achieve (or prevent) the
extension of marriage to same-sex couples, the courts have been
faced with queer parents petitioning for equal legal relationship to
their children, transgendered people and their spouses arguing for
(or against) the legitimacy of their chosen identities, and lesbian
and gay couples negotiating the separation of their relationships
and guardianship of children in the absence of legal marriage, to
name just a few issues.
LGBT family law poses particularly vexed questions because
the ways queer people construct our lives may not be recognized in
law. But families are as much defined by legal definitions as they
are by affect ional bonds or cultural approbation. All family
constructions, even informal and non-legal, may eventually
intersect with the law, even if the connection is one of non-
recognition, or the denial of recognition.
This Article examines the cultural riptide the courts are
wading into when grappling with these issues-what makes a family
and who gets to decide. Courts deciding to extend legal
recognition to new family forms, especially in the hotly-politicized
6. When dealing with sexual and gender minorities, nomenclature is always
an issue. Throughout this essay I use "LGBT," "queer," and "gay" somewhat
interchangeably (particularly in the phrases "gay families" and "queer families"
which could, in this discussion, mean same-sex couples with or without children,
couples one or both of whose members is transgendered, or families whose legal
conflict stems from the homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status of one of
its members), mostly for the sake of brevity. At the same time, I am very much
alert to the fact that the legal, personal, and political issues facing people who
identify through sexual orientation are quite different from those whose identity is
organized around gender transition (not to mention those people for whom these
issues powerfully intersect).
7. For a discussion of the ways in which non-traditional families may try to
replicate some of the rights automatically afforded to legally recognized family
relationships, see Angie Smolka, That's the Ticket: A New Way of Defining Family, 10
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'y 629, 636-38 (2001).
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queer contexts, face charges of overstepping their authority. That
is, of engaging in 'judicial activism."" But law generally, and
perhaps especially family law, is inherently fact-driven,
individualized, and subject to significant discretion. 9  Courts
examining questions of family definition, especially state courts
interpreting state laws, frequently have a great deal of latitude.' So
in the context of changing cultural notions of family constitution,
especially the increasing recognition that gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender people form their own families in need of legal
acknowledgement, it can at the very least be disingenuous to
suggest, as commentators frequently do," that courts recognizing
queer families are taking drastic steps, while implying that those
8. Of course, "activist" decision-making is in the eye of the beholder. As
many observers have argued, "judicial activism cannot be said to be either
conservative or liberal by nature." Joseph A. Reinert, The Myth ofJudicial Activism,
29 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 35, 35 (2004); see also Adam Cohen, Psst... Justice Scalia...
You know, You're an Activist Judge, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A20. For a
searching discussion on the history and significance of the term, see Keenan D.
Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of 'Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REv. 1441
(2004).
9. Virtually all introductions to U.S. family law note that domestic relations
statutes are drafted as general guidelines, and that courts are given broad
discretion to resolve specific disputes. For but one example of such commentary,
see JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 2-3 (3d ed. 2005).
10. Though courts' latitude and responsibilities will necessarily differ
depending on whether their work is based in interpretation of statutes, common
law, or constitutional law. These forms of reasoning have significant conceptual
overlap, but each works from its own body of authority, and each has unique
properties. As a result, however, scholars tend to talk about them as entirely
distinct from one another, which deprives us of the opportunities to examine
points where their varying tracks might run parallel, or even converge. While
acknowledging the difficulty of talking about how courts deal with three such
disparate bodies and sources of law, this Article tries to bridge the gaps, and to
find common ground among their approaches to the questions of queer family
definition.
11. Recently, the pejorative categorization "activist judges" has become
almost code for "judges who would find constitutional protection for gay
marriage." The call for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage
was nearly-universally predicated upon the need to protect the U.S. Constitution
from the threat of "activist judges." See, e.g., George W. Bush, President Calls for
Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2005); Same-Sex Marriage Senate Battle Over, War is Not, CNN, July 14, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/14/samesex.marriage/index.html
(last visited Dec. 27, 2005) (quoting President Bush's comments about "activist
judges'" continued efforts "to redefine traditional marriage"; Senator Bill Frist
asking whether "activist judges" would "destroy the institution of marriage"; and
Senator Orrin Hatch's comments that the amendment would protect the
institution "that a few unelected judges" were trying to change).
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denying such legal recognition are simply "applying the law."
To see where the boundaries of judicial interpretation of
family definitions lie, this Article examines and contrasts state court
opinions that take sharply differing views of their own interpretive
power in LGBT family law cases. 2 Though each opinion must rest
squarely on the statutes and precedents of its own jurisdiction, by
juxtaposing them and examining their reasoning and rhetoric, I
hope to show that arguments on each side of the debate can be
weakly-supported or can rest on solid interpretive foundations.
More importantly, within the boundaries of each jurisdiction's
body of substantive law, arguments favoring each position-finding
for or against the recognition of LGBT families-can be equally
"legal." There is something profoundly inaccurate, perhaps even
dishonest, in describing rulings against queer families as engaging
in legal analysis, while suggesting that decisions in favor of those
same families are infused with politics.
I suggest, moreover, that quite aside from the relevant statutes
and precedents with which the courts must grapple, much of the
action in these decisions actually takes place at the site where the
court does, or in some instances does not, examine the limits of its
own interpretive power. That is because this "authoritative
moment" in many ways indicates a crossroads at which a court must
decide which direction it wants to go, before it comes to any
substantial determination.13 It is the moment at which courts ask:
Are we empowered to decide this case at all? If so, what are the
terms on which we are empowered, and what are the limits on our
jurisdictional mandate?
In queer family law cases (and perhaps many others, though
12. I began my research by gathering as many queer family law decisions from
2000 to early 2005 as I could find. These date restrictions were imposed to limit
the scope of my examination, but also because the enormous changes in cultural
and political attitudes toward gay and transgender people and their families in
recent years suggest that older opinions might not have current cultural
resonance, even if they still stand as binding legal precedent. But I did not adhere
rigidly to these limitations. In some instances, older decisions were so significant
that I felt compelled to include them. Moreover, though I have attempted to
make my pool of potential sources as complete as possible, this paper is not
intended to offer a statistical survey, and I certainly do not discuss here, nor do I
purport to include, every possible opinion that fits within the parameters that I set.
13. This temporal reference can be confusing, though. It is certainly true
that the methodological discussion tends to be placed in an opinion after a
recitation of the facts of the case, andjust before the discussion of the court's legal
reasoning. This makes sense given the logic of a legal opinion, but it does not
necessarily follow that this is the order of the decision maker's reasoning.
2006]
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
that is well beyond the scope of this Article) the authoritative
moment embodies the collisions and resolutions of many smaller
and correlated determinations. If we unpack all the different
strands and directions of thinking that are implicitly recognized,
packaged, and resolved within discussions of interpretive authority
(or, equally importantly, elided in the absence of such discussions),
then we can have a clearer idea of how many facets there are to the
substantive rulings in these cases. Thus, this Article asks what the
courts are really up to when they decide such cases, and attempts to
untangle some of the cords of thinking that are inevitably part of
the rationales for these decisions, but that can be so invisibly
intertwined that we as a legal community (lawyers andjudges) do
not recognize their importance.
This Article tries to begin teasing these threads out, or,
metaphorically, to "map the mind" of the courts. That is, it seeks to
understand what, and more importantly how, the courts are
"thinking" as they decide these cases. In so doing, we begin to see
that only some of these strands are explicit-that is, if they really
were neurological processes, only some would be cognitive and
conscious. Others, I suggest, are sympathetic, 14 in that they
reflexively take place in order for the court to reach its decision,
but are not necessarily examined, or directly articulated in the
court's opinion. This mapping of queer family law decisions is
more than theoretical. It matters because this way of analyzing
what courts are doing and how they are doing it tells us something
new about how family law is being extended or restricted across the
country. It helps us chart patterns of the relationship between the
precedential, the analogical, and the methodological, which allows
us to see the implicit factual predeterminations built into what look
like exclusively procedural and jurisdictional conversations.
The issues in the cases this Article examines range from
seemingly mundane questions regarding uncontested name
changes to unquestionably far-reaching topics of LGBT parenting
and marriage. But from a queer perspective, at least, (and here is
the answer to the pop quiz) all these cases are asking the same
14. The sympathetic nervous system is autonomic, and almost completely out
of conscious control. For a medical definition of the term, see AMERICAN
HERITAGE STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 809 (2002). For a more complete
discussion of the phrase in legal terms, see NAT'L DYSAUTONOMIA RESEARCH
FOUND., GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE AUTONOMIC NERVOUS SYSTEM (1999),
http://www.ndrf.org/ans.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2005).
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question in different ways; are the courts willing and able to
recognize the families we have defined for ourselves, and do we in
fact have the power to identify ourselves and our families in
relation to each other within the law?
A. The Interpretive Braid
In order to begin examining some of these under-articulated
considerations in LGBT family law cases (and perhaps others as
well), I describe three distinct categories of thinking that the
opinions seem to employ. I contend that we can understand these
decisions as braiding together all three strands of reasoning. The
first and most obvious, which I dub "lex reasoning,"1 5 maps onto
the substantive law at hand: either the precedent that is directly on
point or, in the case of first impression where there is no guiding
authority, the policy and interpretive parameters given to or taken
on by the court. The second and third strands, however, may be
equally, and in some instances more, significant to the ways in
which the courts treat these cases.
The second thread I identify follows the courts' factual
reasoning, and their understanding of the cultural significance or
cultural reality of family formation when they encounter and
analyze LGBT families seeking legal recognition. That is, this
analytical thread represents the line along which the courts do or
do not see gay family structures as analogous to families that the
law already understands and recognizes.
The third strand shifts our vision of LGBT family law into the
courts' methodological inquiry itself. It asks how much room the
courts imagine themselves having in order to interpret the law in
ways that will recognize queer families. More importantly, it
constructs a correlation between family definitions that the law
already accepts and sanctions (or rejects and prohibits) and the
ways in which that law can or should be interpreted: Broadly and
15. From the Latin "lex, legis," meaning "law" or "rule." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "lex" in modern American jurisprudence as "a system or body
of laws, written or unwritten, or so much thereof as may be applicable to a
particular case or question, considered as being local or peculiar to a given state,
country, orjurisdiction." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 908 (6th ed. 1990).
I use this term to refer to courts' grappling specifically with the substance
of their own relevant statutory and common law authority because any more
common description of courts' consideration of law-say "legal reasoning " or
"substantive reasoning"-would carry with it the implication that the other forms
of reasoning I describe were not similarly significant.
2006]
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
loosely, or narrowly and restrictively.
While this Article will not ignore the importance of the
application of binding authority embodied in the first strand I
discuss, my focus will be on identifying and describing the second
and third strands of analogy and methodology. My braid metaphor
suggests that each of the strands I've named intersects with the
others, although not necessarily at the same point. It also suggests
that at any given time, we can narrow our focus to see only one
strand, examine the intersection of any two, or step back to take in
a broader view showing how all three are ultimately woven
together.
Just as a braid can tie together strings of similar or quite
different heft, I suggest that the significance of these three factors
in a given case need not be equal. In fact, they may be inversely
related; if the first thread effectively shapes the decision-that is, if
there is enough guidance in the extant body of law to tell the
courts explicitly what to do-the court does not face an interpretive
crisis, and can minimize or even gloss over the other two. But in
the kinds of cases I am looking at, statutes and precedents rarely
provide such clear guidance. Where the directions to the deciding
court are minimal or nonexistent, the court needs to grapple more
significantly with the analogical and methodological components
of its own thinking.
B. A Word About Gay Marriage
Of course, at this particular moment in time the specter
hanging over all of this discussion is the controversy about same-sex
marriage.'6 In recent months and years, several municipalities and
state courts have generated unprecedented anxiety either by
granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples 7 or by ruling that
16. The issue has recently become hotly contested, such that the American
Bar Association Section of Family Law, not especially known for overblown
rhetoric, can describe gay marriage as having "burst with fury into our national
consciousness in 2003." Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An
Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 342 (2004); see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G.
Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: "Same-Sex" Marriage Issue Dominates
Headlines, 38 FAM. L.Q. 777, 777, 799-800 (2005).
17. In 2004 several municipalities licensed or solemnized same-sex marriages,
including San Francisco, Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 465 (Cal. 2004),
New Paltz, New York, Kathianne Boniello, Ulster Wins Appeal to Prosecute Over Gay
Vows, POUGHKEEPSIEJOURNAL, Feb. 3, 2005, at 1, and Multinomah County, Oregon,
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the state constitution must allow gay marriage.'8 We have come to a
point in which struggles over same-sex marriage have transcended
straightforward controversies over the meaning of marriage
statutes, to become full-blown cultural wars.' 9
In the 1970s, gay petitioners in a case such as Baker v. Nelson20
could essentially slip in under radar with the argument that a local
marriage statute simply failed to specify gender and might
consequently be expanded to include same-sex couples.2 ' But with
the national and local defense of marriage acts (DOMA) 22 and
threats of amending constitutions to prohibit gay marriage, that
kind of sleight of hand would today seem disingenuous. Gay
marriage at the turn of the 21st century is an explicitly political,
constitutional, and national issue.
While this essay does not deal directly with the legal and
cultural issues surrounding same-sex marriage, in recent LGBT
family cases the fear of legalized gay marriage is a clear, if
unspoken, subtext-a subtext that makes itself visible through
increasingly restrictive "legal" (what I dub "lex"), factual, and
methodological analyses. When we try to unpack the various
factors affecting these LGBT family law cases, then, we must keep
in mind the cultural climate; the impact of fears about the "threat"
of gay marriage may be so powerful that it can be felt in statutory
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005).
18. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
19. In his dissent to Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia frets at length that the
Supreme Court's abolition of consensual sodomy laws will lead inevitably to the
sanctioning of gay marriage, and that in so doing, "the Court has taken sides in
the culture war." 539 U.S. 558, 602, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. 191 N.W.2d 185, 291 Minn. 310 (1971).
21. Id. at 185, 291 Minn. at 311. Not that this litigation strategy was
successful. The Minnesota trial court and Supreme Court determined that the
term "marriage" meant, and would have meant to the drafters of the state's
marriage statute, "the state of union between persons of the opposite sex." Id. at
186, 291 Minn. at 311.
22. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (declaring that for the
federal government the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife) was enacted in 1996. On its
heels dozens of states have proposed, considered, enacted, and in some instances
repealed their own versions. For an up-to-date survey of the fast-changing array of
DOMA legislation and litigation, see Robin Cheryl Miller & lason Binimow,
Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of Same Sex-United States and Canadian Cases,
1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2005).
23. A recent threat to amend the U.S. Constitution included language
specifying that marriage "shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman."
S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003).
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analyses of LGBT family cases that on their face have no direct
relationship to the legality of same-sex marriage.
4
That caveat aside, I here engage in an analysis of queer family
law decisions that takes seriously the ways in which courts approach
LGBT families. I will be focusing on the analytical frameworks
courts construct in order to make sense of the people whose lives
they are considering and to whom they are granting or withholding
legitimacy. Each section of this essay corresponds to each of the
strands of reasoning that I have explicated above-analysis of lex,
fact, and method. At the end of this Article I discuss the ways in
which the three work in relation to one another, and show how all
may be woven together into what I term the authoritative moment,
which may encapsulate, or even determine, the holding in a
judicial opinion.
II. LEX REASONING IN QUEER FAMILY LAW CASES
One of the first things we teach beginning lawyers is that the
primary duty of the courts is to decide how the rules of law, as set
forth in statutes and interpreted in the common law, apply to the
facts of a given case. 5 Without taking seriously this body of
controlling authority, courts might have unfettered discretion to
render potentially capricious decisions. The very fact that the
ambiguous (and reductive) term 'judicial activism" is available as a
universal pejorative for any judicial action that is seen to exceed the
courts' authority or interpretive mandate26 suggests how strongly we
24. Courts' concerns that they may be criticized as overreaching in
recognizing queer families, or fear that they may inadvertently establish precedent
for gay marriage in their own jurisdictions, seems to affect their decisions in a wide
array of cases which do not, on their face, address the issue. See, e.g., In re
Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (overruling a trial court
order refusing to allow a woman to change her last name to that of her lesbian
partner, on the grounds that it would create an impression that the two were
married).
25. Though perhaps simplistic, this basic description is the ubiquitous
foundation for more sophisticated considerations of legal reasoning. See, e.g.,
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM ET AL., LAWYERING BY THE BOOK 17-67 (2004) (self-
published text of the NYU Lawyering Program); BERCH ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL METHOD AND PROCESS (3d ed. 2002); JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (2d ed. 2003); CATHY GLASER ET AL., THE LAWYER'S CRAFr:
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANALYSIS, WRITING, RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY 9-12
(2002); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING:
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE 15-22 (2d ed. 1994).
26. As Judge Frank Easterbrook recently commented, "Everyone scorns
judicial 'activism,' that notoriously slippery term." Frank H. Easterbrook, Do
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view the courts' obligations to rule within the bounds of already
established law.
So to take seriously the various modes of "thinking" required
by courts in determining whether the LGBT families before them
constitute a family, the only fair place to start is with a
consideration of the relevant bodies of law guiding each court.
Courts themselves struggle mightily to find direction from extant
law even in cases which undeniably present questions of first
impression. LGBT family cases so often require courts to
categorize unfamiliar family structures that they can feel as if they
present entirely novel legal questions. But family law schemes are
generally meant to be flexible, fact-bound, and ultimately
pragmatic, so as to respond to the lived experiences of the personal
lives with which they engage. When deciding how to understand a
new family status such as a same-sex "civil union" then, the
limitations of "lex" guidance can place great strains upon the
courts.
After the State of Vermont enacted its historic law permitting
same-sex partners-even those who did not reside in the state-to
enter into legally-recognized civil unions, the burden necessarily
fell on other states to decide under their own laws the legal
significance of such unions. Civilly united same-sex couples
pressed for their status to be recognized by other states on a variety
of fronts. Given the lack of historical precedent for this newly-
constructed legal status, it is not surprising that most states have
little direct statutory or common law assistance in deciding what to
do with same-sex unions created in otherjurisdictions.
Nonetheless, courts examining the status of gay marriages and
civil unions nearly universally strive to find "lex" guidance to
resolve the question of how to understand this purported legal
relationship. In Burns v. Burns,2 ' for example, the Georgia Court of
Appeals was asked to consider the situation of a divorced woman
whose child custody consent decree required that during visitation,
neither of the former spouses entertain overnight guests to whom
they were not married.28  Mr. Burns contended that Ms. Burns
Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1401, 1401
(2001); see also Leslie R. Weatherhead, Letting Judges Judge: The Myth of 'Judicial
Activism, " 59 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 9 (1999) ("Permeating all of these debates is an
oft-repeated disdain for 'activist' judges.").
27. 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
28. Id. at 48.
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violated that court order by having her children reside overnight in
the home she shared with her female partner.29  Ms. Burns
countered by arguing, in effect, that the couple's civil union
satisfied the requirements of the visitation order because it was
essentially akin to a state of marriage. 30  Civil unions are quite
recent,3 1 so it was unlikely that the Georgia courts would find
unequivocal guidance in established sources of its state law (either
common law or statutory3 2) to aid their conception of this civil
union status. As a first line of analysis, however, the Georgia court
nonetheless strove to find some guidance in some well-settled lex.
The court located an easy answer to the controversy in the
Vermont statute itsef.3 3 As the court of appeals noted, in creating
the new category of "civil union" the Vermont lawmakers carefully
distinguished that state from "marriage," that is, "the legally
recognized union of one man and one woman."34 Moreover, the
Vermont legislators indicated that they offered civil unions only to
same-gender couples who were "therefore excluded from the
marriage laws of this state."35 It was thus a rather straightforward
matter for the court to conclude that Ms. Burns was not actually
married, in Vermont or any other state. Consequently, in keeping
both her partner and her children overnight, she had violated the
terms of the Georgia court order.36 The Burns opinion went on to
consider the status of the same-sex relationship if Vermont had
purported to create a gay marriage,37 but this dicta is anticlimactic;
as the court explains it the purpose of the civil union statutes is
clear, the language of the custody decree is unequivocal, and the
decision feels easily foreordained by the governing law. Such cases
provide little room or reason for courts to engage in complicated
examination of legal policy.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The Vermont civil union statutes, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207
(2004), were passed on July 1, 2000.
32. The story is not quite as simple as I make it, however, since arguably there
was statutory guidance in Georgia in the form of its state DOMA. GA. CODE ANN. §
19-3-3.1 (2004). But perhaps because the constitutional status of that law
remained unclear, the thrust of the Burns court's opinion rests on its analysis of
the Vermont Act.
33. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201.
34. Id. § 1201(4) (quoted in Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48).
35. Id. § 1202(2) (2005).
36. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49.
37. Id.
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In fact, as is their obligation, courts will hew closely to their
understanding of binding legal authority even when it leads to
results with which they are unsatisfied. The Connecticut Superior
Court in Lane v. Albanese, for example, seemed decidedly displeased
with its own conclusion that Connecticut courts had no jurisdiction
to annul a same-sex marriage entered in Massachusetts. 3 Prior to
Lane, however, the Connecticut Appellate Court had concluded
that Connecticut had no jurisdiction under its domestic relations
law to dissolve a same-sex couple's Vermont civil union 39 The Lane
court relied upon the prior opinion's assertion that the
acknowledgment by legal dissolution of gay relationships was a
matter of public policy best left for the legislatures,4° and that the
Connecticut General Statutes provided that "'the current public
policy of the State of Connecticut is now limited to a marriage
between a man and a woman.' 4 ' This explicit legislative act,
coupled with the clear precedent established in Rosengarten, led the
Lane court inexorably to determine that it lacked jurisdiction to
dissolve a same-sex marriage.42 Yet the court's language in its
38. See No. FA044002128S, 2005 WL 896129 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,
2005). This decision is unpublished, but is readily available on Westlaw. I have
gathered and used several unpublished decisions for this research because their
presumed unavailability as precedent does not alter my analysis of their content.
Though perhaps it should. At least one respected jurist has suggested that
unpublished opinions may not be as precisely reasoned, or as carefully drafted, as
those intended for publication. Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't
Cite This!: Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW. 43, 43-44
(2000).
Yet others contend that unpublished opinions may be a backhanded way
of addressing controversial issues without raising a fuss. Suzanne 0. Snowden,
Note, "That's My Holding and I'm Not Sticking to it!": Court Rules that Deprive
Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1253, 1256 (2001). If true, this could mean that cases dealing with LGBT
rights are particularly susceptible to being decided in unpublished opinions. In
any case, commentators are increasingly questioning whether unpublished
opinions ought to remain uncitable, and some even suggest that the current
practice of issuing non-precedential opinions is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Jon A.
Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Firth Amendment:
Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L.
REV. 195, 211-223 (2001).
39. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
40. Lane, 2005 WL 896129, at *3.
41. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-727a(4) (2004)).
42. Id. at *4. The court did go on to discuss a further basis for denying
jurisdiction, which was the questionable legitimacy of the marriage even under
Massachusetts law. Massachusetts statutes prohibit marriages to non-residents if
the marriage would not be legal in the participants' home state. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 207, § 11 (2004). Since Connecticut law and public policy made it likely that
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concluding comment seems to inject a note of regret: "Unless and
until our legislature enacts legislation that reflects a public policy
favoring recognition of civil unions or marriage between same-sex
couples, this court has no choice but to dismiss this case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction."4 3
It seems apparent, and not especially surprising, then, that in
defining (or not defining) LGBT families, courts will try to follow
what they conceive to be binding law regardless of their ideas on
the matters before them. But this is no easy task. In a society that
only in 2003 overturned laws criminalizing homosexual sex,4 the
advent of the open and celebratory queer family seeking legal
consideration is a relatively recent phenomenon. It stands to
reason that most legislatures drafting, and courts interpreting,
statutes related to marriage, divorce, adoption, custody and other
intimate familial topics did not consider the possibility of the queer
family. As the New York Supreme Court observed when deciding
in Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospitat5 whether a surviving same-sex
partner whose relationship had been solemnized in a Vermont civil
union qualified as a "spouse" for the purpose of bringing a
wrongful death claim on behalf of his deceased partner, "[t]he
court acknowledges that at the time the wrongful death statutes
were written, the use of the term spouse did not envision inclusion
of a same-sex marital partner.,
46
Given this absence of direction as to how to treat these newly-
emerging families, the courts must find some way of "filling in" the
law on point. Even as they try most meticulously to seek direction
from mandatory authority, the comparative newness of these family
forms gives courts wide discretion in determining which theories
and analogies most closely hew to the jurisdiction's established
policies and "lex." Consequently, even when they strive to adhere
closely to statutory language and established precedent, different
courts can come to quite different conclusions.
the same-sex marriage would not be legally recognized in Connecticut, it may,
under Massachusetts law, have been null at the outset. See Lane, 2005 WL 896129,
at *4.
43. Lane, 2005 WL 896129, at *4.
44. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
45. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). Since the witing of this article was
completed, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, reversed Langan.
802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). The reversal was handed down too late
for analysis of it to be included in this Article before publication.
46. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
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Some of the divergences we find in these cases must be
attributed to significant variations in each jurisdiction's body of law.
Every state that has enacted a defense of marriage act,47 for
example, will necessarily look at gay relationships differently from
states that have not done So. Additionally, states having public
policies favoring the legitimatization of same-sex unions will have
quite yet another set of potential directions. In asking whether it
has jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex union entered into in
Vermont, for example, the Massachusetts Superior Court in Salucco
v. Alldredge agreed with the Connecticut analysis that a civil union is
not a marriage, and that consequently the state's divorce statutes
were inapplicable. 49 But Massachusetts is the state that brought us
same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.50 Thus
the Salucco court did not end its work with its conclusion that
divorce statutes were inapplicable.5 Instead it found that Goodridge
offered binding precedent establishing that Massachusetts law and
policy require that same-sex couples be afforded the same legal
protections as opposite-sex couples.52 Thus the court determined
that its general equity jurisdiction entitles it to fashion a remedy for
the dissolution of a civil union.
There is certainly no other jurisdiction besides Massachusetts
that currently has the precedent of gay marriage to guide its
consideration of civil unions. But does that make it similarly true
that no other state can find a way lawfully to recognize civil union
status? Even without the assistance of Goodridge, the New York court
in Langan did not believe itself so constrained. Acknowledging that
"the concepts of marriage evolve over time," and that "public
47. As of August 31, 2005, at least thirty-nine states had DOMAs,
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, or both. For a map
illustrating the status of anti-gay family measures in the various states, see National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Marriage Measures in the U.S. (2005)
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf (last visited Dec. 27,
2005).
48. In fact, had the Burns analysis not rested comfortably on the question of
whether a civil union was a marriage, the court would likely have found Georgia's
DOMA dispositive. See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
(commenting that recognizing foreign same-sex marriages would violate GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004)).
49. Salucco v. Alldredge, No. 02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Mar. 19, 2004).
50. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
51. Salucco, 2004 WL 864459, at *3-4.
52. Id. at *4.
53. Id. at *4-5.
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opinion regarding same-sex unions" was undergoing a similar
change,54 the court concluded that Langan was his deceased
partner's spouse for the purpose of the state's wrongful death
statutes. Although it remarked that a court must be "certain of its
ground"56 before categorically changing the meaning of a statute
(here, section 10 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, defining
marriage), the Langan court examined the purposes, privileges and
function of civil unions and determined that "[t]he civil union is
indistinguishable for societal purposes from the nuclear family and
marriage.,57
The differing decisions about the legal status of foreign civil
unions in Massachusetts and Connecticut seem nearly
predetermined by Massachusetts' gay marriage rulings. But what
accounts for the divergence between Connecticut and New York?
It could be argued that the New York case is predicated on the
uniqueness of the state's holding in Braschi that gay partners may
be considered family members for the purpose of succession in
rent-controlled apartments.58  And the Langan opinion does
liberally reference Braschi.9 But the Langan court appears far more
directly bound by Raum v. Restaurant Associates, in which the New
York Appellate Division held that despite Braschi, a same-sex
partner did not qualify as a spouse for the purpose of New York
wrongful death law. 60 Nonetheless, the court determined that there
was no mandatory authority addressing the rights of civilly united
partners under the wrongful death statutes, and found compelling
reasons why they ought to be included.61 It hardly seems, then, that
New York precedent required the Langan finding. Rather the
opposite-it was only by carefully distinguishing the legal status of
same-sex marriages in Massachusetts from same-sex unions in
Vermont that the New York Supreme Court escaped the conclusion
that its own precedents required a contrary result.
Unless we conclude that either Langan or Lane is actually
54. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003),
rev'd, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
55. Id. at 422.
56. Id. at 421 (quoting In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir
1980)).
57. Id.; see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1999) (defining marriage).
58. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989).
59. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
60. Raum v. Rest. Assoc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
61. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
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categorically wrong," then, these cases help illustrate that courts
have wide latitude in deciding how to envision the queer families
that have not previously been imagined by legislators and judges.
Something beyond the narrow dictates of direct legal authority
influences, and perhaps in some instances underlies, their
determinations. The remainder of this Article seeks to theorize
about what that "something" might be.
Before moving past the topic of "lex" reasoning, however, it is
important to reflect that the authority the courts are grappling with
in LGBT family cases can be either direct statutory instruction, or
common law interpretation, or more often, both. There are
certainly important differences in the ways these disparate legal
sources operate and in their level of authority over judicial action.
In fact, this is an understatement. There is a wealth of scholarship
devoted to discussing the way that courts should interpret statutes,63
and though there is a wide array of opinions about how much
discretion judges have in statutory interpretation,u there is little
question that unless unconstitutional, legislative acts carry greater
weight than judicial interpretations.
Even leaving aside the inherent differences among the states'
62. As indicated supra in note 45, the Appellate Division has decided just that:
Langan, according to the majority, was categorically wrong. 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005).
63. A search of law reviews and academic journals in the Westlaw database
shows almost 300 articles with "statutory interpretation" in the title. Amazon.com
lists more than 100 books with the words "statutory interpretation" in the title.
The Library of Congress catalog lists 9976 entries under the keywords "statutory
interpretation."
64. It may be a gross oversimplification of a vast intellectual field, but scholars
of judicial interpretation of legislative acts have been divided roughly into two
camps: "textualists," such as Justice Antonin Scalia, and proponents of "dynamic
interpretation," such as William Eskridge. Both groups may be hard to define, and
the borders between them can be amorphous. In general, though, textualism can
be thought of as urging judges to follow the commonly understood meaning of
enacted texts, rather than searching for the intent of the drafters or for any other
interpretive realm beyond the words on the page. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3-47 (1997). "Dynamic
interpretation," conversely, assumes that legislation must be assumed to be
multilayered, culturally-specific, and evolving over time. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48-60 (1994).
One debate between these poles centers around the question of whether,
in the absence of explicit legislative direction, courts may, or may not, do
substantive reading of the law. This Article need not wade deeply into that
discussion because my point sidesteps it; I contend that in the uncharted waters of
queer family law definition, at least, whichever side the courts choose requires a
"substantive" determination.
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collective bodies of family law, then, the different prominence and
methods usually afforded the interpretation of statutes and
common law ("plain meaning" and cannons of construction vs.
comparison and distinction of material facts and reasoning) might
suggest that it may not be possible to meaningfully compare
judicial opinions interpreting or relying on differing sources of
authority.15 And in the most basic way, it is not. It would certainly
be unhelpful to try to draw absolute conclusions by placing
decisions based on such disparate sources next to one another.
But when courts are addressing the novel questions of law with
profound cultural implications, and their extant body of law does
not give direct guidance (which it rarely does in these first
impression cases of family definition), their choices of what topics
to consider or which legal concerns to bring to the forefront are
particularly significant. Regardless of whether the court grounds its
analysis in divorce statutes or common law definitions of "spousal"
relationships, a court seeking to decide whether it can act on a
same-sex civil union must grapple with the relationship between
civil union and marriage, as well as meaning and significance of a
non-marriage adult affiliation. The convergence of many of the
central inquiries in these cases makes their frequent contrasts
telling. At the very least, these comparisons are fascinating, even if
not analytically definitive.
I start, then, with the premise that most courts, most of the
time, strive mightily to apply the laws of their jurisdictions as they
understand them. But LGBT family definition cases can rarely be
resolved only by referencing direct authority. Where existing
statutory definitions of family do not bind the courts, and they
cannot glean legislative intent requiring a particular definition of
family for the purpose at bar, there exists a wide sea of interpretive
65. Though in a surprising number of instances such differences may be less
significant than the categorical boundaries between common law and statutory
interpretation may suggest. The same operative question may often be at issue for
courts grappling with statutes as for those applying common law. When dealing
with custody and visitation for children, for example, almost all states apply the
"best interest of the child" standard. But the origins and meaning of that standard
may be derived either from statutory or common law, or in many instances, both.
That is, in some states the standard was introduced through common law, and in
others, adopted by legislatures. In either case, moreover, the accumulation of case
law commenting on the meaning of the "best interest" standard has significantly
shaped and perhaps clarified the term. Despite these disparate and possibly
multiple sources, however, each state purports to consider the same general
question: What best serves the child's welfare?
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opportunity. Amid such leeway the court may construe its mandate
broadly (or practically), so as to include a new queer family within
its collection of human relationships of which the law must be
aware. Or it may restrain itself from entering the fray, thus
rendering the relationships before it purely informal and without
legal weight. If the extant enactments, regulations and judicial
determinations fail to tell the courts which choice is preferable,
they will have to stretch beyond pure "lex" if they are to decide
what to do with the queer litigants before them.
Once courts are reaching into the realms of uncertain
interpretation, their work cannot consist solely of applying generic
legal rules. Instead, the court's understanding of "law" (in the
"lex" sense of the word) becomes commingled with its
interpretation of the facts of the case before it.
III. FRAMING THE ISSUES: FACTUAL REASONING
When a court cannot find precedent resolving a given
controversy, or at least no precedent that seems precisely on point,
it must attempt to compare the case before it with something
already familiar. If the direction offered by prior jurisprudence is
minimal, as it often is in LGBT family-recognition cases, courts
frequently find themselves looking for comparable family
structures in order to make sense of what they are seeing. Their
intention is to work out whether the family form before them can
map comparatively neatly onto pre-existing shapes or categories. If
that is not possible, then they must decide whether to analogize the
new facts before them to older ones that they already understand.
How they frame these facts-as a somewhat novel but patently
recognizable nuclear family, as a radical change to everything we
know and understand about the basic social unit or as something in
between-will dramatically shape the court's legal analysis. As
linguists such as George Lakoff suggest, differences in the way we
frame ideas-that is, the way we describe them to ourselves and
others-have real and discernable consequences. 6 Rather than
being merely semantic variations, differences in framing can
connect to archetypal (and consequently comprehensible)
66. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! 3-34 (2004). Indeed,
Lakoff suggests that the way issues are framed can sway, and even determine,
national elections. See id. (suggesting that in the 2004 elections conservatives were
successful in adopting metaphors that resonated with national values).
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metaphors, or can simply wash over us without resonance. 67 Simply
stated, "metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous, and
mostly unconscious," but nonetheless "we live our lives on the basis
of inferences we derive via metaphor."6 So in order to understand
one part of courts' work in reasoning through LGBT family law
cases, we must look closely at the way they conceive of gay families,
particularly to how closely or distantly they imagine those families
to match the traditional norms.
A. Thinking By Analogy-The Power of Categories
We can see this process of matching the unfamiliar with the
familiar in cases addressing marriages in which one of the partners
is transsexual. Despite having been certified through state-issued
marriage licenses, marriages between transgendered persons and
their now-opposite sex husbands and wives can nonetheless be
subject to collateral attack.
The decisions in these cases are often constructed around a
simple categorization question; what is the legal gender of the
transsexual partner? The cases present a straightforward
dichotomy-either the court accepts the transsexual partner as the
sex he or she identifies with, or it does not.69 In theory, official
67. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson make the point that metaphors are
conceptual, not merely linguistic. That is, they embody ideas that may be
culturally-specific, but are so widely held that they shape our very thoughts.
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 3-6, 245-46 (2d ed.
2003).
Lakoff and Johnson are but two of many linguists, literary theorists,
psychologists, philosophers and other scholars who have examined the
importance of metaphor in human understanding. For a foundational
examination of the centrality of metaphor in abstract thinking, see PAUL RICOEUR,
THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE CREATION OF MEANING
IN LANGUAGE (Robert Czerny trans., 1975). For groundbreaking work on the
importance of metaphor in law, see the writings of Steven L. Winter. See, e.g.
STEPHEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAw, LIFE, AND MIND (2001);
Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
68. LAKOFFANDJOHNSON, supra note 67, at 272-73.
69. Although the resolution of this question is hardly an easy one, and courts
often struggle mightily with the significance of their decisions. In fact, courts may
find the gender complexities these cases present to be so complicated that they
make logical rhetorical moves inconsistent with their basic findings. For example,
it seems to be increasingly common for courts finding no gender change to
nonetheless refer to transsexuals by their preferred (that is, new) pronouns. See,
e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999) ("Throughout this
opinion [plaintiff] will be referred to as 'She.' This is for grammatical simplicity's
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records should make this fairly easy. In many of these cases, the70
trans spouse has changed her or his name, been issued new
identifying documents (driver's license, social security number,
etc.), and has had her or his birth certificate altered to reflect the
new gender. If courts accept these documents as accurately
representing the person identified within them, then the
relationship they see is a heterosexual marriage whose difference
from the norm is isotopic. That is to say, the basic substance is the
same, but the marriage may have somewhat different physical
properties. If not, then the relationship in question will be
elementally different, and probably not cognizable.
An early case dealing with a marriage between a transsexual
woman and her biologically male husband illustrates the easy way
in which a court may view a sex change operation as constituting a
complete change in legal gender.7 ' The plaintiff, M.T., applied in
NewJersey family court in 1975 for support and maintenance from
her soon-to-be-ex husband, J.T. 72 The husband claimed that he was
not obliged to pay, because M.T. was transsexual and therefore not
a woman, making their marriage void.73 M.T. had identified as
female since her early teens, and in 1971 underwent gender-
sake, and out of respect for the litigant.... It has no legal implications."); see also
In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 307 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (noting its
first pronoun reference to petitioner to explain that the court uses "He" out of
.respect for petitioner," but that the term is not legally significant).
70. The appropriate nomenclature for those whose gender identity does not
correspond with their biological sex at birth is a complicated one. Medical
literature and most court decisions generally use the term "transsexual" to refer to
those who have begun or completed sex reassignment. But the term is sometimes
spelled "transexual," which can be a simple spelling variant, or can be intended to
distance the word from the psychological and medical connotations that the
former spelling may have. NATIONMASTER.COM, TRANSSEXUAL,
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Transsexual (last visited Dec. 27,
2005). Others use the term "transgender," which was introduced and adopted for
a variety of reasons, including the notion that gender may be complex, and that
transgender-identified people may, or may not, identify solely with one biological
sex. WIKIPEDIA, TRANSGENDER, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transgender (last
visited Dec. 27, 2005). Because none of these terms has been fully accepted, and
all are deemed to have some conceptual problems, the umbrella term "trans" has
been introduced, and adopted most often by activists. Id.
This Article uses the more current term "trans" interchangeably with the
other descriptors used by the various courts and litigants to describe those seeking
to have their changes of gender legally recognized.
71. M.T.v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
72. Id. at 205.
73. Id.
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reassignment surgery."4 In 1972 she and the defendant, a man with
whom she had lived since the mid-1960s (before M.T.'s surgery)
married in the State of New York before moving to live in New
71Jersey.
The family court's opinion examined at length the actual
surgery M.T. underwent, and recited expert opinion on the
psychological and social ramifications of transgender identity. 6
The court used its review of M.T.'s medical procedures to
determine whether she was male or female, since, "we accept-and
it is not disputed-as the fundamental premise in this case that a
lawful marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial marriage
of two persons of the opposite sex, a male and a female.""
As the court observed, in the early 1970s there was very little
case law concerning transgendered people.78  Thus, the court
looked to a British case from 1970 as the closest analogue.7 9 But
the New Jersey court came to a conclusion different from the
British one, which held that a person "cannot 'affect her true
sex.'" 80  The New Jersey court concluded that M.T. was doing
everything in her power to present herself as, live as, and be a
woman."' Ultimately, therefore, the court held that if M.T. was "by
virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the full capacity
to function sexually as a male or female . . . , we perceive no legal
barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in public
policy to prevent that person's identification at least for purposes of
marriage to the sex finally indicated."8'2 M.T. was a woman, hence
her marriage was valid and she was entitled to maintenance and
support.
8 3
If, on the other hand, a court does not accept that one can
change sex or gender categories regardless of how one lives, what
one is called, or how much documentation one has, then
heterosexual marriage and the union between a biological man
and transsexual woman (or vice versa) cannot be understood as a
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 205-07.
77. Id. at 207.
78. Id. at 208.
79. Id. (analyzing Corbettv. Corbett, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P.).
80. Id. at 209 (quoting Corbett, 2 W.L.R. at 1323).
81. Id. at 211.
82. Id. at 210-11.
83. Id. at 211.
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normative marriage. It is of a different substance altogether.
Courts reaching such a conclusion refuse the validity of this
marriage, often claiming that what they are really looking at is a
form of same-sex marriage.
Thus in Estate of Gardiner, the son of Marshall Gardiner, who
died intestate, challenged the right of his father's wife, a post-
operative transsexual woman, to inherit Gardiner's estate. 4 The
son claimed thatJ'Noel Gardiner was not legally a woman and that
her marriage was invalid. J'Noel Gardiner previously underwent
sex reassignment and was issued an amended birth certificate in
Wisconsin; she and Marshall Gardiner met and married in Kansas,
where he died a year later.86 Declining to recognize in the State of
Kansas any change in J'Noel's legal gender, the court granted the
son's petition.8 7 The court held that the plain meaning of the
Kansas marriage statutes and defense of marriage act was that a
marriage was valid only between two people who were of the
opposite sex at birth.8 The court stated unambiguously that "the
words 'sex,' 'male,' and 'female' in everyday understanding do not
encompass transsexuals ... A male-to-female post-operative
transsexual does not fit the definition of a female.8 9
These two cases raise an important question: How does the
court know either that a formerly male litigant "should be
considered a member of the female sex for marital purposes" 90 or
that she "does not fit the common meaning of female"?9' Despite
the fact that the cases turn on such a determination, the answer to
the question can be surprisingly opaque.
In In re Nash, an Ohio court of appeals refused the application
for a marriage license between a biological woman and a post-
operative transsexual man. 2 Jacob Benjamin Nash, born Pamela
84. 42 P.3d 120, 121 (Kan. 2002).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 123.
87. Id. at 121.
88. Id. at 126. In fact, though, that is not precisely what the statute says. It
reads, "[t]he marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract
between two parties who are of opposite sex. All other marriages are declared to
be contrary to the public policy of this state and are void." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
101 (2001).
89. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
90. M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
91. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
92. Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
31, 2003).
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Ann Nash, had amended his Massachusetts birth certificate to
include a change of his name, and to alter his designated gender
from female to male.93 But the Ohio court refused to accept the
validity of the revised birth certificate and determined that Nash
had not thereby legally changed his sex.94  Defining sex by
reproductive function (quite different from the court in M.T. v.
J. T., which defined sex by sexual function), the court held that the
category "male" simply cannot include a female-to-male
transsexual.95 If Nash cannot be male, then the marriage cannot be
valid, and to validate it would be, as the court says "placing our
'stamp of state approval' on an actual marriage that is directly
contrary to Ohio's public policy on same-sex marriages.
9 6
But why can Nash not be male? Certainly, one answer is that
the court defined male as "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova,917 which categorically excludes
Nash. But this begs a larger question-why is the ability to
reproduce the operative definition in Nash, rather than the sexual
function definition in M. T. v JT.? The Nash court provided no
reasoning to explain that this definition is more convincing than
any other; it simply laid out the definition as self-evident, and
moved on from there.98 And the dissenting opinion in Nash,
although sharply disputing the majority's conclusion, applied
93. Id. at* 1.
94. Id. at *7.
95. It's no accident, given the era, that the primary nonreligious argument
against gay marriage is not reproduction itself but the possibility of reproduction.
96. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6. It seems more than coincidental that
courts have become increasingly conservative on the issue of transsexual marriage,
and have begun linking it to chromosomal sex rather than sexual performance.
In many of these decisions, the threat of gay marriage looms large, and the courts
are doing everything possible to defer even a hint that they approve of or want to
make possible same-sex marriage. If there is the slightest doubt that a transsexual
person might be in any way the same sex as her/his partner, the courts reiterate
the prohibitions against gay marriage and equate validating marriages of
transsexual people to partners of the other sex and same-sex marriage, which must
be prevented.
97. Id. This reliance on reproduction to define gender echoes the increasing
reliance foes of same-sex marriage have placed on the (at least theoretical)
likelihood of reproduction in heterosexual unions as grounds for giving them
different legal status from homosexual ones. See, e.g., Peter Sprigg, Questions and
Answers: What's Wrong with Letting Same-Sex Couples "Marry?", FAMILY RESEARCH
COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IF03H01 (last visited Dec. 27, 2005)
(explaining that the hypothetical possibility of reproduction makes heterosexual
couples the only "structural type" that should be favored and protected, even if its
members do not want, or cannot have, children biologically).
98. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6.
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analogous reasoning. ' The dissent concluded quite simply that
Nash's gender change was apparent.'00 In its forthright appeal to
common sense, it asserted without citation that taking Nash's
gender on faith is one of those issues that "[is] so obvious, and [the
results of the case] so clearly wrong, that we must look back and,
like Dr. Phil, wonder 'What were they thinking?""0'
The legal persuasiveness of Dr. Phil aside, what is so striking
about both opinions in this case is the shared assumption of a
transparent worldview requiring little support from other sources.
For the Nash majority, sex equals reproductive capacity-that
conclusion is self-evident and demands no further debate. Yet for
the dissent, such a way of imagining sex is "so clearly wrong," and
accepting Nash's declaration of his gender is "so obvious," that it
equally speaks for itself. While these questions of gender
identification may seem knotty, both sides in this case comfortably
assert that the answers are easily apparent, despite the fact that the
court's presumably thoughtful and carefully considered opinions
wholly diverge on this point.
The Texas Court of Appeals in Littleton v. Prange found itself
similarly untroubled about a transsexual's true gender.0 2 In this
case Christie Littleton, a male-to-female transsexual, brought a
wrongful death suit against Dr. Mark Prange, who had treated her
husband before he died.0 3 Prange challenged Littleton's right to
sue, arguing that since she was transsexual her marriage could not
be legally recognized. 4 In asking whether Littleton had standing
to sue for the loss of her husband the court laid out the legal issue
plainly: "[C]an a physician change the gender of a person with a
scalpel, drugs and counseling... ?",05 The opinion opens with a
statement that the case presents "the most basic of questions.
When is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?' 0 6 So this
99. See id. at *10-12 (Christley, J., dissenting).
100. See id.
101. Id. at *12.
102. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
103. Id. at 225.
104. Id. (challenging suit on a motion for summary judgment that surviving
spouse's status was not a proper wrongful death beneficiary).
105. Id. at 224. The rest of the quote may presage the answer, however: "[O]r
is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?" Id. Even if the
religious reference suggests no specific political or philosophical orientation,
posing the question as one of human intervention versus divine plan does tend to
give the latter the advantage.
106. Id. at 223.
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court, too, was asking whether surgery can alter someone's gender
from male to female. While the court did go into considerable
detail in its decision, citing cases from around the country and
around the world, its answer to this question is ultimately
arrestingly simple: Christie just is a man, by dint of her
chromosomes and her original birth certificate. °7 ("Biologically a
post-operative female transsexual is still male. 10 8 ) In the
concluding words of the opinion, "[t]here are some things we
cannot will into being. Theyjust are.' 9
Such an assurance is nearly tautological. And for those who
would disagree, it is nearly impossible to respond to. It
encompasses an entire worldview about the immutability of gender.
Yet the court's confidence in its belief that "some things ... just
are" is not, as we have seen in Nash above, necessarily ideologically
linked. After all, both the majority and the dissent in that case
argued from the self-evidence of their positions. Both sides agree
that one is either male or female and that someone has to be either
one or the other. They simply categorically disagree with one
another about which group the applicant before them falls into.
As there is a dearth of legal precedent on this issue, courts
must determine for themselves what and who they are dealing with.
Most importantly, though, despite the complexities and
ambiguities of gender that people on all sides of these decisions
seem to acknowledge, the court must make a clear and
unambiguous determination attaching a certain gender to a
person, because the categories the court must work with are
absolute. " " But since the medical, social, and legal guidance for
the courts seeking to determine the transsexual litigants' gender
are not seen as dispositive, these various courts have little room to
support their positions, or even to reason carefully through them.
Rather, to avoid an irresolvable quagmire, they must make a leap of
107. See id. at 224.
108. Id. at 230.
109. Id. at 231.
110. Or at least the courts assume so. Feminists and gender activists might
critique the assertion that the construction of gender is absolutely binary. See, e.g.,
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(1990). However, courts do not seem willing to entertain any notion of murkiness
or complexity in gender identity. It is probably difficult enough for them to
decide whether trans people are "male" or "female"; asking them to entertain the
possibility that one could be consciously, let alone legally, "both" or "neither" is
unrealistic, and may in any case not be legally advantageous for trans litigants.
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intuition, or of faith."'
The language of intuition, and even more so, of faith, makes
an uncomfortable fit with legal analysis. After all, discussions of
legal decisions take for granted that courts' determinations are
entirely analytical and reasoned from precedent (or, alternatively,
critics lambaste decisions as being inadequately reasoned) . Cases
dealing with transsexuals' marriages tend not to operate that way,
however. Rather, the courts' conclusions seem to issue from a flash
of insight, a powerful belief about the way the world works and
should work. Certainly, the means by which courts generate these
beliefs are not preordained. This is not least because well-meaning
courts faced with essentially the same question (that is to say, what
gender is this person?) can occupy polar opposite positions. More
strikingly, so can judges sitting on the same court, analyzing the
same statutes and precedents. Neither side offers proof for its
conclusion; on the contrary, statements like "some things ... just
are" defy legal authority, or, rather, stand as authorities, as
statements of indisputable fact.
Such a belief is not achieved by a process of methodical
analysis. It is achieved instantaneously-either you see it or you
don't. But this is not to denigrate this mode of thinking. As
Malcolm Gladwell suggests, intuitive thinking-the leap of faith-
may be as important, and in some instances, an even more reliable
intellectual process than considerations arrived at more
methodically or meticulously.13 At the same time, it is important
that we identify this kind of thinking for what it is, and differentiate
it from the reasoning processes by which we assume law usually
111. As St. Augustine succinctly describes it, "[f ] aith therefore is to believe that
which you do not see, truth is to see what you have believed." ST. AUGUSTINE, ON
THE GOSPEL OFJOHN XL, at 9.
112. Take for an example the persistent critique of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959
(1973). Though the debate over abortion may be one of politics or morals, the
legal criticism of the Court's opinion in Roe has been grounded in argument that
the decision lacks legal foundation. See, for but one example, ROBERT BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 103
(2003) ("Whatever one's feelings about abortion, [Roe] has no constitutional
foundation, and the Court offered no constitutional reasoning.").
113. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING
13-14 (2005). Gladwell asserts that even though "we are innately suspicious ... of
rapid cognition," decisions reached intuitively and near-instantaneously "can be
every bit as good as decisions made cautiously and deliberately." Id. Some of
Gladwell's methods and broad conclusions have been critiqued, but the success of
his work has put the idea of instantaneous decision-making in the public
consciousness, and his notions resonate at least somewhat with most of his readers.
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operates.
Although these transsexual marriage cases are quite different
from each other in terms of content (inheritance, the granting of a
marriage license, standing in a wrongful death suit), they all share
this leap of faith. All demand statutory interpretation, and their
core issue is the same; if marriage is legal only between people of
opposite gender, is there a valid marriage on the facts at bar, or
not? If the court determines that the marriage contains two
partners of different genders, then marital law kicks in and
whatever rights and responsibilities accord to that law are in force.
If the court decides instead that, whatever the state Vital Records
Officers and the Division of Motor Vehicles say, the transsexual
spouse is still the sex on his or her original birth certificate, then
none of the rights and responsibilities of marriage can attach.
4
Ultimately, then, the courts represent the factual content of
the cases as straightforward, and the decisions they came to as
easy.15 What the courts do not make visible is the fact that the ease
of the decision is linked directly to the power of the courts' faith in
determining gender. If it is easy to work out whether someone is
male or female-if that determination 'just is"-then everything
else follows.
B. Thinking Laterally-Are Queer Families Like Straight Ones?
While courts can apply a straightforward "is s/he or isn't s/he"
categorization to cases concerning transsexual people, many other
types of LGBT family cases require more than a choice between two
clear possibilities. Instead, the cases ask judges to construct
broader analogies between existing family forms and the queer
families seeking legal acknowledgement.
In the Florida case of Peterman v. Meeker,"6 for example, a gay
114. Unless, of course, the State is willing to open the status of marriage to
partners of the same gender. It is not hard to imagine that the fear of opening the
door for gay marriage may underlie the rigidity with which some of these courts
determine gender. In fact, the comparative ease with which the New Jersey court
accepted M.T.'s gender change in 1975 might be connected to the fairly limited
ramifications a court of that time could imagine such a decision having.
115. This is not to say that discovering the factual content is easy. Littleton
spends many pages poring over every possible precedential or related case before
deciding on the actual facts of the case. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex.
App. 1999). But once it has determined how to determine sex, the work that sex
does in these cases is the same.
116. 855 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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man sought an injunction against his same-sex partner on the
charge of domestic violence. A couple for thirteen years, John
Peterman and Nute Meeker's relationship was dissolving, and
Meeker sought an injunction against Peterman to protect himself
from violence. "7 Peterman's attorney opposed the restraining
order, contending that the Florida statutes concerning domestic
violence applied only to heterosexual couples." 8 In a remarkably
brief and untroubled opinion the court dismissed Peterman's
claim." 9 Pointing out that the domestic violence statute states
explicitly that "[n]o person shall be precluded from seeking
injunctive relief., solely on the basis that such a person is not a
spouse,"12° the court held that the gender of the two partners had
no relation to the applicability of the statute. 2 1 The court observed
that the case presented a wholly new issue for Florida, but that the
analogy to similar cases in other states, and to unmarried
heterosexual partners, was sufficiently compelling to convince the
court that the statute should include same-sex partners.11
2
But even if the analogies between unmarried hetero- and
homosexual partners seem fairly direct in cases of domestic
violence (one adult romantic partner is alleged to be harming
another), when parenting relationships are involved it becomes
significantly more complicated to frame queer family relationships
as analogizable to commonly-understood straight ones. The
reasons why such an analogy can be harder to draw can be seen in
what have become known as second-parent adoptions. These are
legal adoptions by a nonbiological parent of the biological child of
his or her gay partner without the termination of parental rights of
the birth parent, so that the child will have two legal parents of the
123
same sex.
117. Id.at 690.
118. Id. (arguing that FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2002) does not protect homosexuals
against domestic violence). The statutes define family or household members as
.spouses, former spouses, persons related by blood or marriage, persons who are
presently residing together as if a family or who have resided together in the past
as if a family, and persons who are parents of a child in common regardless of
whether they have been married." FLA. STAT. § 741.28(3) (2002).
119. Peterman, 855 So. 2d at 691.
120. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 741.30(1)(e)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: "%en Crossing the Marital Barrier is
in a Child's Best Interests, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 96, 98 (1987); Elizabeth
Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recognition of
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It is a basic fact of biology that two people of the same sex
cannot produce a child together,14 and a legal fact that they can
rarely adopt children jointly. 125 If they do seek joint adoption, as
genetic strangers to the child, a gay or lesbian couple will be
biologically, and perhaps legally, on the same footing as a
heterosexual couple. 126 But where one partner in a gay couple is
already a biological or adoptive parent of a child and the other
seeks legal parenting status, the question becomes one that straight
couples do not face; c+an the other intended parent be legally
recognized without severing the legal rights of the first? Adoption
laws are predicated on the assumption that the new parents replace
the old, whose parental rights are terminated. The original
(biological) mother is substituted with the new (adoptive) mother,
and the same for the father, if known. Obviously, an adoption
cannot work quite the same way for two parents of the same
gender. So the couple must petition for a second-parent adoption,
asking a court to declare that the child has a new mother or father,
in addition to, rather than instead of, the existing one.
Gay couples seeking second-parent adoptions imagine
themselves as presenting a straightforward request. They are
simply asking that courts legally recognize the reality of two people,
one legally related to the child and the other not, choosing to raise
a child together.127 For the courts, however, the question can carry
the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 729, 733 (1986).
124. Of course, neither can some heterosexual couples. In fact, much of the
technology that queer parents use to conceive-assisted insemination, in vitro
fertilization, surrogacy-was developed to help infertile heterosexual couples
produce children. Nonetheless, the importance and centrality of procreation is
often given as a primary reason why the government can or should promote
heterosexual marriage but prohibit legal marriages by persons of the same sex. See
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for Proscribing Same-Sex Marriage, 32
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 667-68 (2004).
125. Most states only allow joint adoptions to legally married couples. Lynne
Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 643, 651 (2004) (though the author observes that some courts "circumvent
this by interpreting 'person' in the statute as 'persons"').
126. Some jurisdictions or adoption agencies may have a preference for
heterosexual couples over homosexual ones, and adoptions by gay people may be
prohibited altogether. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). But ifjoint adoption
by two parents is allowed, then the status of both adoptive parents will be precisely
equivalent.
127. Consequently, a great deal of resources for gay families are devoted to
finding ways to legally recognize both biological and non-biological parents. For a
frequently-updated example of advice to such families, see Gay Parenting,
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with it a dizzying array of ramifications. Does caring for a child
have the same status as being biologically related to that child?
Does the state's law permit a child legally to have two mothers or
two fathers? What does this say about the relationship status of the
parents?
In fact, in comparable heterosexual situations, that last
question might be enormously important. There is a longstanding
assumption that parentage within heterosexual marriage is shared.
One of the rights of marriage is that if a married woman delivers a
child, the law generally takes for granted (in the absence of
evidence to the contrary) that her husband is the child's father and
she is the child's mother, even if that child is the result of donated
eggs and/or sperm.12  And for similar reasons, in many states a
stepparent can adopt her or his spouse's child without displacing
the parental rights of the child's biological parent of the same
129
sex.
With neither biology nor lawful marriage to easily determine
the legal status of the legally non-recognized gay or lesbian parent's
connection to the child, courts face a more exacting task in second-
parent adoption cases than they do (or at least, than they imagine
they do) in the trans marriage cases. Now they must weigh a
complex array of considerations including the intention of the
http://www.gay.com/families/parenting/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2005). Even the
American Academy of Pediatrics has issued a report supporting the legalization of
such ties, noting that second-parent adoption has "important psychologic and
legal benefits." Ellen C. Perrin et. al., Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent
Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRIcS 341 (2002).
128. See LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 995 (2d ed. 2000)
("Today, all states, by statute or common law, provide that a married woman's
husband is at least rebuttably presumed to be the father of her children."). For a
concise history of the marital presumption of paternity, see Katharine K. Baker,
BargainingZ or BioloZy? The Histor and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 12-13 (2004).
129. In fact, if state statutory schemes or common law permit second-parent
adoptions for unmarried heterosexual stepparents (and a few do), the problem of
gay or lesbian non-biological parents will probably be resolved by "lex" extension,
rather than broader analogy. See In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179 (Del. Fain. Ct. 2001).
That is, the position of the non-marital partner of one legal parent can be seen as
a "third" parent whose rights may be recognized because of his/her relationship to
the child, rather than any specific relationship with the child's parent. Id. But few
states offer stepparent adoptions to unmarried partners, so for the cases discussed
here, the operative questions present the courts with more vexing issues, requiring
more searching evaluations of the status of non-married gay partners. For a
general summary of state laws on stepparent adoption, see TIM O'HANLON,
STEPPARENT ADOPTION: A RESOURCE BOOK (2004).
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family to create a two-parent household, the lack of legislative
provisions for formalizing the relationship between the two
parents, the significance of any provisions allowing heterosexual
stepparents to adopt children in their homes, and, always, what is
in the best interests of the child [ren] in question. They must reach
to decide whether, even if statutes do not specifically provide for
such a scenario, they can frame their understanding of same-sex
parents so that their family relationships are analogizable to
straight ones, and consequently legally recognizable.
In re Adoption of M.M. G. C.'30 is a typical second-parent adoption
case, and operates as a clear model for the kinds of decisions courts
can make if they are inclined to construct analogies in favor of
queer families. A lesbian couple, Shannon and Amber Crawford-
Taylor, petitioned the Indiana trial court to adopt jointly three
children, two from Ethiopia, and one from China, whom Shannon
had already adopted singly.' The county's Division of Family and
Children Services endorsed all three adoptions, describing the
family as "relaxed and comfortable."3 2 The trial court, citing the
state's limitation of joint adoption to married couples and the
Indiana DOMA, which states "[o]nly a female may marry a male.
Only a male may marry a female,' 33 denied the couple's petition.34
The Indiana Court of Appeals took a different approach. The
court immediately connected Amber's status with that of a
stepparent, and explicitly equated "second-parent adoption" with
the adoption of a child by a stepparent. 135  Since Indiana law
allowed a stepparent to adopt a stepchild without terminating the
parental rights of the biological parent of the same sex, the court
reasoned that an analogous process could work for same-sex
couples. 1
36
To the extent that the appellate court referred to statutes, it
invoked the flexibility and humanity of statutory rule. Since the
right of adoption was "unknown at common law," the purpose of
Indiana adoption statutes, the court reasoned, has been to adjust to
changing family forms-married couples, stepparents, and single
130. 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
131. Id. at 268.
132. Id.
133. IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (1998).
134. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C. 785 N.E.2d at 269.
135. Id. at 270.
136. Id.
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people. 137 Moreover, the overriding principle for adoption statutes
has been the best interest of the child. 138 Throughout its decision
the court did not question that Shannon and Amber Crawford-
Taylor constitute a family, or that their joint legal parentage is in
the best interest of their children.139 And in case it was not clear
from its decision, the court ends its opinion by citing a series of
cases that insist upon the mutability and social responsibility of
both common and statutory law, as well as the need for the courts
to work in concert with the legislature. 140 Accordingly, despite the
fact that the Indiana legislature had explicitly prohibited same-sex
marriage,14 the M.M.G. C. court maintained:
Consonant with our General Assembly's policy of
providing stable homes for children through adoption, we
conclude that Indiana's common law permits a second
parent to adopt a child without divesting the rights of the
first adoptive parent. Allowing a second parent to share
legal responsibility for the financial, spiritual, educational,
and emotional well-being of the child in a stable,
supportive, and nurturing environment can only be in the
best interest of that child. 42
Unspoken but clear in this short and untortured decision is
the ease of analogy between the lesbian parents in the case and
their not-quite-equivalent heterosexual counterparts. For the
Indiana court, Shannon and Amber Crawford-Taylor are parents.
Although their family might be different from the statistical norm it
can be effectively analogized in order to fit into the statutory and
common law requirements of Indiana adoption law. The absence
of marriage or mutual biological relationship with the child is, for
the court, beside the point. Amber's relationship to her children is
assumed to be like that of a married parent or stepparent, since it
can be framed as similar, at least from the children's perspective.
However, just because the Indiana court found the analogy
between lesbian co-parents and stepparents easy to make does not
137. Id. at 270.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 270-71 (citing Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 7
(Ind. 1993); Sandy Ridge Oil Co. v. Centerre Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 510 N.E.2d 667,
670 (Ind. 1987); Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972)).
141. In 1998 the Indiana State Legislature passed Indiana Code section 31-11-
1-1, entitled "Same Sex Marriage Prohibited."
142. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C. 785 N.E.2d at 270-71.
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mean that other courts, in other jurisdictions, find such an
equation equally effortless. In In re Adoption of Doe, for example,
the Ohio Court of Appeals with equal ease came to precisely the
opposite conclusion. 43  The Doe court rejected the stepparent
analogy, and by defining the biological mother's partner as "an
unmarried adult" rather than the equivalent of a spouse,
concluded that her partner could not adopt their child without
terminating the legal rights of the biological mother. 44  The
concurrence to the opinion invoked the limitation of marriage to
heterosexuality and "the legal reality that two individuals of the
same sex cannot marry under existing Ohio law and therefore
cannot be spouses to each other,' 45 but neither the opinion nor
the concurrence took the additional step of looking for recognized
(and recognizable) family structures to which this family could be
compared. 1
46
Of course, one of the differences between these two cases is
the willingness or unwillingness of each court to make the kind of
leap of faith that we saw in the trans cases. 147 One assumes that of
course same-sex parents can be analogizable to heterosexual
families; the other, that of course people who cannot marry cannot
be like stepparents, let alone like heterosexual biological parents.
These opposite stances arise from the same set of conditions-
same-sex couples just do not have children the same way that
heterosexual couples do. So any comparison between these gay
and lesbian families and straight ones will be some kind of a
stretch. The question becomes how far the courts are willing to
extend that stretch before it breaks apart. And their inclination to
do so ultimately depends at least in part upon untheorized beliefs
about the validity of queer families.
C Thinking Sensibly-Avoiding Absurdity
The ideological (although not necessarily politically partisan)
divide between those courts viewing LGBT families and
heterosexual ones as comparable and those not doing so plays itself
out in the ways each describe the inevitability of their decisions. It
can also be found in the ways the courts characterize the alternative
143. 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
144. Id. at 1072.
145. Id. at 1073.
146. Id.
147. See supra Part III.A.
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positions. If each side views its own understanding of the legal
status of the queer family before it as not just rational but obvious,
then it is only a short logical step to conclude that any contrary
interpretation must therefore be ridiculous, even absurd.14  This
has important doctrinal implications, because courts take for
granted that in construing statutes they want to avoid the absurd,
however they define it. Absurdity implicates a very specific rule in
the canons of statutory construction; statutes must be interpreted
within the limits of what we might call common sense.149  But
additionally, whether done honestly or disingenuously, framing
opposing viewpoints as absurd has the effect of putting them on
the defensive-conveniently, without having to argue or carefully
reason through the point. The examples discussed below suggest
that this trope is exceedingly common in LGBT family law cases
and can be employed by courts taking either a traditionalist
position, or one favoring queer alternative families.
What does it mean when courts dismiss positions they do not
agree with as absurd? In How to Do Things with Words, philosopher
J.L. Austin offers a useful aid in thinking about such claims.'50
Austin describes what he terms "performative language"-language
that does rather than states, reports, or describes, and enacts
through speaking ("I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" or 'You're
out!").1' Given the power of the courts to decide controversies and
to construct interpretations of law, their words, at least those which
cannot be set aside as mere dicta, are nearly always performative.
148. See, e.g., In reAdoption of Baby Z, 699 A.2d 1065, 1075 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1996) (stating its holding and noting that "[t]o do otherwise would lead to absurd
results." Such rhetorical moves can be found in many cases in which an implicit
worldview is taken for granted, despite the existence of sharply contrasting
approaches to the issue at hand. Perhaps the most well-known such maneuver is
the U.S. Supreme Court majority's characterization of the appellant's claims in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) as "facetious" even in the face of a
strong dissenting views (one drafted by Justice Blackmun, and joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens; another drafted by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall), and despite sufficient opposition to the case to
lead to its being overturned less than two decades later in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003)).
149. For an extensive and thoughtful examination of "absurdity" in statutory
reading, see generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387 (2003).
150. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina
SbisA eds., 2d ed. 1975) (compiling a series of lectures originally delivered in
1955).
151. Id.
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But performative language requires an agreement by all parties
that the words spoken mean and do a particular thing, that the
person uttering them is entitled and qualified to say them, and that
once the words are spoken everyone involved will behave
accordingly.5 2  Consequently, there are any number of ways in
which performative language can derail.
153
Austin terms inaccuracies or inexactitude in performative
language, or performative language by persons without power to
execute the act, "infelicities.', 154 Even more infelicitous, though, is
the category that the courts imagine as absurd-utterances that are
impossible, travesties of actual performatives "where there is not
even a pretence of capacity or a colourable claim to it... no
accepted conventional procedure."' 5  These utterances are
unhappy not because the speaker has no right to perform the act,
or because the affected parties refuse to cooperate in the
performance, but because under any circumstances the
performative could not be successful. It is in Austin's terms, "a
mockery, like a marriage with a monkey.''
7
Certainly for many jurists and legislators marriage between two
women or two men is not far removed from marriage with a
monkey, and is legally just as possible 58 That cartoonish image of
unbelievable silliness seems to be precisely the way that courts
invoking the language of the absurd would like to characterize any
countervailing positions. Similarly (or perhaps conversely), for
other courts, denying the existence and legitimacy of queer families
is quite apparently equally silly, or absurd.
Consider a second-parent adoption case from Nebraska, In re
Adoption of Luke.'59 In its opinion, the Nebraska Supreme Court first
observed uncontrovertibly that "[w]hen construing a statute,
appellate courts are guided by the presumption that the Legislature
intended a sensible, rather than an absurd, result in enacting a
152. Id. Lecture 2 at 14-15.
153. Id. at 17-18.
154. Id. at 14. Austin considers such infelicities to be any "sin" against one or
more of the rules he enumerates for language to be understood as truly
performative.
155. Id. at 20.
156. "I pick Ruth for my team." "No thanks, I don't feel like playing." Despite
the initial performative language, Ruth is not now on the team. See id.
157. Id. at 24.
158. Indeed, if we are to believe Justice Scalia, it may be a small step from the
decriminalization of sodomy to gay marriage to marriage with a monkey.
159. 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002).
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statute.' 6 ° On the heels of this pronouncement the court noted
that the state's adoption statutes spell out procedures for co-parent
adoption by legally-married stepparents. 161 In light of this statutory
provision the court determined that requiring the same-gender
biological parent to relinquish parental status when a stepparent
adopts would be "an absurd result. 1 62 But the court was patently
unwilling to analogize such a situation to the circumstances faced
by a same-sex couple. 63 Instead, the court concluded with little
trouble (and without citation) that the "parents' parental rights
must be terminated or the child must be relinquished in order for
the child to be eligible for adoption.",
64
For this court then, the impossibility of extending the
stepparent exception to same-sex parents was not merely self-
evident. By inserting the notion of absurdity into its discussion of
the meaning of the Nebraska stepparent adoption statute, the court
strongly implied that any suggestion that the statute could be
stretched to include the lesbian petitioner was itself inconceivable.
But the assumption of absurdity is not inevitably linked to one
particular stance. For example, in In re Adoption of Baby Z, a case
very much like In re Luke, the Superior Court of Connecticut
introduces comparable rules of construction: "the adoption statutes
can be construed 'in a manner that will not thwart [their] intended
purpose or lead to absurd results.... We must avoid a construction
that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly
on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.""165 But using this
very similar interpretive tool, the Connecticut court came to a
position exactly opposite of Nebraska's.1
66
Deciding to remand the case to the probate court so that the
adoption could take place without terminating the biological
mother's rights, the Connecticut court concluded that to do
otherwise "would lead to absurd results and thwart the legislative
intent of the adoption statutes which is to promote the best
160. Id. at 382.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 382.
164. Id. at 382-83.
165. 699 A.2d 1065, 1073 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn.
1999) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 595 A.2d 297 (Conn. 1991)). Though the
decision was reversed, the superior court's reasoning is still relevant to the point
under discussion.
166. Id. at 1073-74.
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interests of the child."'1 67 Moreover, the court cited an earlier New
Jersey case using almost identical language: "[T]he stepparent
exception to the natural parent's termination of rights should not
be read literally and restrictively where to do so would defeat the
best interests of the children and would produce a wholly absurd
and untenable result.'
68
Ironically, despite such repeated imprecations against
construing statutes to the point of absurdity, when faced with the
task of applying statutory '.chemes to anomalous family
constructions courts can on occasion push the bounds of credulity.
Indeed, even when statutes encourage courts to interpret liberally,
judges seem so constrained by the limits of the analogy required to
understand queer families that they cannot expand their sense of
what a family might be. Two cases-one dealing with the
dissolution of a marriage between a woman and her transsexual
husband (In re Marriage of Simmons), the other a second-parent
adoption (In re Angel Lace M.)-illustrate this problem.
In re Angel Lace M. 16 9 is somewhat different from other second-
parent adoption cases in that Annette G., the biological mother of
the child, was legally married to the child's biological father Terry
M. when the child was conceived. 170  Later, she and her female
partner Georgina G. petitioned to allow Terry to relinquish his
parental rights (which Terry was willing to do) in favor of
Georgina. 17' The Wisconsin adoption statute is quite clear that it
should be construed as broadly as necessary "to affect the objectives
contained in this section. The best interests of the child shall
always be of paramount consideration, but the court shall also
consider the interest of the parents or guardian of the child.' ' 72 In
light of this directive to construe adoptions liberally, and given that
all three parents concurred that it was in Angel's best interest that
Terry give up his parental rights and that Georgina adopt, it is
somewhat surprising that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not
find the proposed adoption legally permissible. 73  The court
instead injected a series of slippery slope concerns, claiming that if
167. Id. at 1075.
168. Id. (quoting Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)).
169. 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
170. Id. at 680.
171. Id. at 681.
172. Id. at 681 n.3 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 48.01 (1993)).
173. Id. at 686.
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Georgina be allowed to adopt, any random unrelated adult could
disrupt families with spurious adoption claims. More ominously,
the court mused that if "the trial court had the power to make any
order it pleased so long as the order could somehow be justified by
recitation of the rubric 'in the best interests of the children,' the
limits the legislature placed on the court's exercise of power in
custody matters would be meaningless."7 5  By the end of its
opinion, the court held out the troubling vision of a child
accumulating parents ad infinitum.1
76
For the Wisconsin court, to construe the adoption statute
broadly, as the statute itself says it ought to be, would produce on
these facts "an absurd result.""' It stated firmly that it would "not
construe a statute so as to work absurd or unreasonable results.' 78
The idea that a biological father could give up his rights as a parent
to benefit his ex-wife's lesbian partner was inconceivable to the
court: in a word, absurd. 79 Even though the petitioners pointed to
various provisions in the statute that would make such a ruling
possible, the court itself refused the possibility... Having
introduced the "absurd result" of a multiply-parented child, the
court insisted that despite the statutory exhortation toward reading
adoption rules permissively it was "harmoniz[ing] the rules of
statutory construction" by determining that Georgina would have
to lose her parental rights if Annette adopted Angel. 8'
This anxiety about unfamiliar family forms and the attendant
refusal to take statutory directives about liberal interpretation at
their word appears even more strikingly in In re Marriage of Simmons,
an Illinois divorce and custody case between Jennifer Simmons and
her husband Sterling, a female-to-male transsexual. 182 Jennifer and
174. Id. at 682-83.
175. Id. at 681.
176. Id. at 684.
177. Id. at 682.
178. Id. at 683.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 683-84.
181. Id. at 684. It is worth noting that despite the fact that In re Angel Lace M.
still stands as good law from the highest court in the state, more than thirty-five
gay or lesbian second-parent adoptions have been granted in Wisconsin since the
decision was handed down. Mary Zahn, Adoptions for Same-Sex Couples Caught in
Legal Limbo, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2005, at Al, available at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/sep05/358630.asp.
182. 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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Sterling were married in Illinois in 1985.183 In 1991 Jennifer
underwent artificial insemination, which resulted in the birth of a
child.184 As Jennifer's husband, Sterling was listed on the birth
certificate as the father 85 In 1994, the Illinois State Registrar
issued Sterling a new birth certificate with the gender designation
of "male.' 86
When the couple split up, Jennifer contended that their
marriage had been invalid and that Sterling's consequent paternity
of their child, legally conferred not through genetic ties but
through his status as Jennifer's husband, was similarly void.'87
Under the Illinois Parentage Act, if "a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the
husband shall be treated in law as if he were the natural father of
the child thereby conceived."' 8 As with many of these cases, the
court determined that Sterling was not male but female, and hence
agreed to nullify the Simmons' marriage. 89 The court then went
on to nullify Sterling's relationship with his child-if Sterling was
not legitimately Jennifer's husband, how could he be the child's
father?' 9°
However, the Parentage Act seemed to explicitly provide for
this eventuality by declaring that a husband is presumed to be the
father of his wife's child "'even though his marriage is or could be
declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived during such
marriage.""9' But in spite of the statute's language, the court
stripped Sterling of parental rights by working backwards from its
denial of his male gender.' 92 Concluding that "petitioner is not a
man within the meaning of the statute," the court found that the
section of the parentage statute regarding invalid marriages did not
apply to his now dissolved marriage. 193 As in In re Angel Lace M., the
court here seemed to ignore the plain meaning of the statute,
which appears directly to require liberal construction of extant
parent-child relationships. Yet such a result was not considered by
183. Id. at 307.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (1984).
189. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309-10.
190. Id. at 313-14.
191. Id. at311 (quoting 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5 (a)(1), (2) (1984)).
192. Id. at 311-12.
193. Id. at 312.
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the court to be absurd.
So what do all of the invocations of strict construction and the
risk of absurdity tell us about the ways in which courts approach
these cases? Well, one of the things the court has to ask itself when
deciding whether to recognize a queer family is simply what it is
looking at. This is true whether the court is making a judgment of
category, as in the trans marriage cases, or a more complicated
analogy, as in the second-parent adoption cases. And many of the
courts that are making determinations are ultimately basing them
not on methodical reasoning, but by a seemingly irrefutable
internal compass telling them what a family looks like, or at least
what they assume the legislature thinks a family looks like. This
sense that it "knows what a family is when it sees it' ' 94 may explain
why, no matter how difficult or easy the court imagines its decision
to be, another set of judges asking comparable questions can find it
equally straightforward or complicated to reach precisely the
opposite conclusion.
The fact that some courts find the answer to that question to
be easy and, not coincidentally, resolvable within a few pages, while
other courts examine the question at length, does not change the
fact that all of them are searching for ways to understand proposed
new forms of family. As with any truly novel situation in the law,
when facing LGBT family law cases the courts must ask themselves
how far and how hard they would have to push existing law in
order to extend it to cover these alternative families. The more
attenuated they see the analogies between the queer families and
those that are legally recognized, the more they must ask whether
they do, or do not, have the authority to legitimize such families at
all.
IV. THE METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY
The final strand of judicial thinking that I see in the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender family law opinions involves the
194. This sentiment may be employed frequently in queer family law cases, but
the dissent in In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1015 (N.H. 2003) (New Hampshire
adultery case) goes so far as to cite it directly. Quoting Justice Stewart's hoary
observation about the indefinability, yet obviousness, of pornography, Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J, concurring), the dissent supports its
conclusion that the majority's limitation of the term "intimate extramarital sexual
activity" to heterosexual sex was overly narrow and defied common sense.
Branchflower, 834 A.2d at 1015 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
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courts' consideration of their own roles and power. When a court
tries to answer any question in law it faces a series of decisions
about how it will answer that question, and whether it ought, in
fact, to be answering it at all. I call this process of almost self-
reflective evaluation and decision-making the court's
"methodological inquiry." This methodological inquiry can take
many forms, including extensive meditations on the meaning of
the judiciary or passing asides about how the court performs its
duties. The most significant of these inquiries raise explicit
substantive questions about the separation of powers among
branches of government, and implicitly assume or even explicitly
examine the authority of the judiciary itself.
A. Thinking About Rules; Thinking About Roles
The simplest and probably most unexceptional form of
methodological inquiry can be found in jurists' commentary
informing the reader of the court's intellectual process. In such
instances the court is staking out for itself, and announcing to its
readers, the way it has proceeded in reasoning through its decision.
When we look at LGBT family law cases, for example, we find (not
surprisingly) that many of the questions raised by these cases
require the interpretation of statutes. Accordingly, a court will
remind itself how it should set about doing that work. It may
invoke timeless principles of statutory language such as, "[w]e first
look to the language of the statute itself and, where terms are not
defined therein, 'we ascribe to them their plain and ordinary
meanings' '0 95 or, "[e]ach undefined word in [a] statute must be
ascribed its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. ' 96 Given
the complex and sometimes contradictory array of interpretive
canons and guidelines traditionally available for such work, 9 7 it
195. Blanchflower, 834 A.2d at 1011 (quoting Wegner v. Prudential Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 803 A.2d 598, 599 (N.H. 2002)).
196. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 311.
197. For a classic critique of the indeterminacy of the accepted canons of
construction see Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950),
reprinted in 5 GREEN BAG 2D 297 (2002). See also Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 805-18
(1983). But see, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1999) (arguing for an empirical analysis of
the normative defenses of canons); John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons'
Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283 (2002) (arguing that canons can be useful as
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makes sense that judges would seek to explain and justify their
reasoning by describing how, precisely, they went about reading
and understanding the relevant statutes.
But courts may also expand this methodological exploration
beyond their means of reading statutes to incorporate their
examination of their own responsibilities and obligations in a wider
array of situations. They might, for example, review their own
authority to interpret common law: "' [T]his Court should not
hesitate to alter, amend, or abrogate the common law when
society's needs so dictate."''0 8  They might also ask and answer
questions about what sources they should view as authoritative
when reaching their own decisions: "This being a case of first
impression, we may consider cases from other jurisdictions that
have dealt with this issue."99
These almost procedural examinations of the court's
reasoning process may carry with them embedded notions about
the proper relationship between the enacters of law and the
interpreters of it: "[I]f we can give effect to the ordinary meaning
of the words adopted by the General Assembly, we must apply the
statute as written."20 0 But the kinds of discussions I am referencing
here are not jurisdictional in any legal sense. Nor do they
themselves constitute the outcome or the meaning of the opinion.
Rather, they are designed to remind the law-trained reader of a
shared understanding of how courts ought to do their jobs. Such
comments tell us something about the process of the court's
reasoning-its methodology. They function as signposts, making
sure that the court and the reader share a common understanding
of the rules of the road.
Signposts can be illustrative and informational ("7th Avenue"),
but they can also be directive and restrictive ("No Passing").
Similarly, courts' broader methodological inquiries are not merely
informational, but substantive and even determinative. In such
instances, while asking by what means it can reach its decision, the
court is also asking whether it can. That is, the court is examining its
role in creating law, both as a supplement to and in contrast to the
organizing principles for statutory interpretation).
198. In re the Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
(quoting Sandy Ridge Oil Co. v. Centerre Bank Nat'l Ass'n 510 N.E.2d 667, 670
(Ind. 1987)).
199. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
200. In reAdoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
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role of other governmental bodies. It is defining the limits of its
own authority. When courts question their authority to render
decisions, the very holding of the opinion may be bound into the
court's quest to determine how it ought to function.
In In re Guido, for example, Frank Joseph Guido, Jr. petitioned
New York Civil Court for a change of name to Cynthia Alexandria
Frank.20' Guido was just beginning the process of transitioning to a
female gender, and, without having yet begun sex reassignment
202
surgery, was trying to start living full-time as a woman. Acting pro
se, Guido requested a name change to facilitate the new identity.
The court twice refused the application, asking for a new petition
certifying completed sex change surgery20 4 and clarifying Guido's
marital status. 2 5 At the time of the petition Guido was legally
married to a woman, and the court concluded that it could not
grant the name change because it would "permit the applicant to
appear and represent himself as female, while in fact he remains in
a legal relationship with his wife premised on being male.20 6
When Guido applied for a name change for the third time
with the assistance of counsel, the civil court took a very different
approach.20 ' Granting the application, the court maintained that in
the previous decisions it had "concerned itself with matters outside
the scope of the court's jurisdiction and beyond the scope of the
inquiry necessary to avoid lending the court's assistance to fraud."
2 8
The judge hearing this new petition 20 9 was persuaded that Guido
was requesting only a name change, not a change in legally-
recognized gender.2 0 Accordingly, the only issue before the court
was whether the name change was legitimate-that is, whether or
201. 771 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003).
202. Id. at 789-90.
203. Id. at 789.
204. Previous courts examining this application seemed convinced that the
name change could only take place upon a doctor's certification that sex
reassignment was completed, while Guido's physicians maintained that the name
change was integral to the beginning of the sex reassignment process. Id. at 790.
205. Id.
206. Id. Once again, it is worth noting that a legal action which had previously
been considered fairly mundane, changing names to accommodate a sex change,
has been problematized by the specter of gay marriage.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. It is unclear from the opinion whether this is the same judge who had
reviewed the earlier applications. See id.
210. Id. at 791.
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not it encouraged fraud.2 1' The significance of the name Frank
Guido chose to adopt, though clearly female-identified, was legally
irrelevant since "[t]he law does not distinguish between masculine
and feminine names, which are a matter of social tradition.,
21 2
Through its methodological determination that examining any
question other than Guido's freedom to adopt a new name was
irrelevant and thus beyond its scope, the Guido court cut off any
possible debate about the legitimacy of sex changes, or whether a
married transsexual should be viewed as having a heterosexual or
homosexual relationship. It diverted attention solely to technical
concerns, and expressed its indifference to the social world of
gender.1 4 The approach resonates with the New Jersey court's
conclusion that the fact that two women's wish to share the same
last name has only to do with nomenclature, and nothing to do
with gay marriage.21 5  As a matter of jurisprudence, such a
determination may make enormous sense. But in the context of
swirling controversies over what even Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court dub a "Kulturkampf"2 1 6 these moves may also seem
disingenuous.
Frequently, a court's examination of its authority in queer
cases means asking itself how much of the social context
surrounding a particular issue is appropriate for the court to
grapple with. If it is true that issues related to LGBT families, or
even LGBT persons, are always controversial, then it becomes
incumbent on the court to decide how much or how little of that
controversy is relevant when deciding the case before it. As an
211. Id. at 790.
212. Id. at 791.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 790-91.
215. In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579, 585 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001).
216. Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. The politicized nature of these topics can make any public discussion of
them enormously complicated. In an attempt to be "fair," media representatives
frequently attempt to give "both sides" of any issue involving LGBT families,
infuriating queer activists who argue that doing so lends credence to bigotry. And
both queer and anti-gay activists are quick to critique media representations of
LGBT issues that omit their perspectives. See, e.g., Peter LaBarbera, Associated Press
Says Story Celebrating Lesbian Students is "Fair, "CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA, Jan.
16, 2003,. http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id=3079&
department=CFI&categoryid=cfreport (criticizing AP's defense as "fair and
balanced" of an article that it ran about two lesbian high school students voted
.cutest couple," without offering any disapproving commentary).
218. See Beth Barrett, Defining Queer: Lesbian and Gay Visibility in the Courtroom,
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Ohio case, In re Bickneli' 9 demonstrates, the court may choose to
put the social ramifications of queer families aside, and find that
the only issue before it is strictly statutory.
The lesbian couple appealing in Bicknell asked the court to
certify a change in their surnames to a combination of both
partners' last names, so that the partners could unify their joint
family name before the birth of their first child.2 20  The Ohio
Supreme Court's opinion deliberately separated the social issue of
a lesbian family seeking to present itself as such from the narrow
legal question presented by name change requests.22' For the
court, the only question at issue was whether the petitioners were
misrepresenting themselves.222  Since their desire for a name
change does in fact accurately represent their situation-they are
two adults expecting a child and desiring to have a surname in
common-there was no fraud, and their applications were
therefore reasonable and proper.2 2 3
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bicknell dissent countered this
approach by explicitly invoking the social context of the name
change. 2 4  The dissenting opinion charges that allowing the
petitioners to change their names lends "the stamp of state
approval" to their relationship, which is "directly contrary to the
state's position against same sex and common-law marriages.
2 25
That petitioners' inability to legally marry in Ohio is unchallenged
is irrelevant. For the dissent, not only are they taking a step toward
portraying themselves as "married," but the majority opinion is by
default making social policy in allowing them to do so.22" With such
hotly-contested social policy at issue, then, the dissent concluded
that the majority had stepped beyond its role and rendered a
decision which "should clearly be made by the General Assembly
after a full public debate and discourse, not by judicial
legislation.
227
In the majority opinion, by contrast, the social context of gay
12 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 143, 176 (2000) (arguing that gay litigants tend to succeed
when their experiences are manifest in the courtroom).
219. 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002).
220. Id. at 847.
221. Id. at 848-49.
222. Id. at 848.
223. Id. at 849.
224. Id. at 849 (Stratton,J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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marriage was irrelevant.220 The court observed that
appellants' only stated purpose for changing their names
is to carry the same surname to demonstrate their level of
commitment to each other and to the children that they
planned to have. Both acknowledge that same-sex
marriages are illegal in Ohio, and it is not their intention
to have this court validate a same-sex union by virtue of
granting the name-change applications.2
More importantly, the court removed itself from commenting on
the public policy implications of its decision, because "any
discussion ... on the sanctity of marriage, the well-being of society,
or the state's endorsement of nonmarital cohabitation is wholly
inappropriate and without any basis in law or fact., 23 0 There is a
certain common sense in the majority's approach: when the
question before the court is an uncontested issue of nomenclature,
and in the absence of fraud (in which case the law allows a great
deal of liberty in changing one's name), it could seem excessively
zealous or even petty to refuse to allow the Bicknell appellants to do
SO.
While that may be true, though, it is hard to say honestly that
the social context does not hang heavily over the questions before
this court. It may be appropriately put aside jurisprudentially, but
we can see that in doing so the court is (deliberately or not)
sidestepping the policy facet of the case. The litigants themselves
recognize this-were it not for their desire to be recognized as a
family-a social category as well as a legal one-they would not
likely be seeking the name change in the first place.
One could argue that the Ohio court effectively dodged the
methodological question by claiming that the name change was
both private (solely about this couple and their potential
child[ren]) and statutory rather than public and legislative. Yet
whether it says so or not, the court was making a methodological
argument by taking for granted that it is within its power to grant
the name change. Doing so required the court to assert that it was
proper to limit the inquiry to questions of fraud and
misrepresentation. When the courts in Guido and Bicknell set aside
the social issue to focus on the purely legal, they may be doing
228. Id.
229. !d. at 849.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 847.
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something that is both legally and socially correct, but that
literalism can feel naive to the opponents of gay rights, and
certainly can be read as not simply legal but also strategic.
More importantly, when questions of LGBT families arise in
more legally complicated or politically fraught contexts, courts are
under even more pressure. The discounting of social policy in an
area of law where petitioners have broad leeway seems complicated
enough. But the thorny questions of judicial role in policy-making
(or at least, in crafting legal decisions that arguably shape important
social policy) become even more complicated in cases affording
litigants fewer liberties, or demanding more exacting interventions
by the courts. It is exactly that question of the relevance of social
policy that can make courts ask, just as the Bicknell dissent does,
whether they ought to be deciding these questions at all.
B. The Dance of Deference
Queer family law cases are hardly unique in raising questions
of policy, but as a category they do pose a unique challenge to the
judiciary. Though the gay or transgendered litigants seeking
recognition of their families may pose their questions to the court
narrowly, presenting them simply as questions of legal
232application, opponents of alternative families see such cases as
arenas of vital social, cultural and even moral significance.233
Courts taking differing views on the cultural consequences of these
cases will naturally have different views on their own roles in
deciding them.
The accepted legitimacy ofjudge-made law is foundational in a
common law system.3 Nevertheless, within the legal system of the
United States, the clich6 is that the power given to the judiciary is
232. Litigants may pose such questions whether or not they themselves actually
believe this, or have simply adopted it as a rhetorical strategy.
233. For example: "The evidence demonstrates incontrovertibly that the
homosexual lifestyle is inconsistent with the proper raising of children.
Homosexual relationships are characteristically unstable and are fundamentally
incapable of providing children the security they need." Timothy J. Dailey,
Homosexual Parenting: Placing Children at Risk, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL,
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS01J3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2005); see also Peter S.
Sprigg, Defending the Family: Why We Resist Gay Activism, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL,
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=PD01LI (last visited Dec. 27, 2005).
234. For a foundational and still-relevant rumination on the role of judges in
crafting common law, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921).
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to interpret law, not to initiate it.2 35 At the infancy of the American
court system John Marshall observed that "[i]t is the peculiar
province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society. '' 236 It is incumbent upon courts, then, to
know their place-to leave to elected lawmakers the job of making
new law. It is therefore not surprising to find in judicial opinions
addressing seemingly novel questions about the legal recognition
of queer families a fair amount of rumination about whether doing
so is a matter of interpreting law or making it.
The line between the interpretation and the creation of law is
hard to discern, however, and we have never achieved national
consensus on where that line might lie. In fact, the debate over
exactly that point informs Supreme Court decisions regarding
controversial social questions such as school busing,2 37 abortion,
and more germane to this project, gay marriage.239 Volumes of
commentary have been produced regarding differing judicial
philosophies, their alignment with political affiliations, and their
jurisprudential consequences. 240 This contentiousness regarding
235. Even Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175-77 (1803), in which the Supreme
Court established for itself the right to interpret the meaning of the Constitution,
is careful to reserve only for Congress the right to enact legislation.
236. Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810).
237. Though Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is nowadays
generally regarded as correctly decided and well-settled, it does not similarly follow
that the subsequent implementation of decisions beginning with Brown 11, 349 U.S.
294 (1955), and extending through such decisions as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Keyes v. School District. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973), are accepted with equal equanimity. The latter have been
more widely criticized as examples of overreaching by thejudiciary. See, e.g., DAVID
J. ARMOR, FORCEDJUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1995).
238. There can be no doubt that the national debate over the Court's
legalization of at least some abortions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), led in
great part to the differing notions of privacy rights articulated in Roe and Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
239. The Massachusetts Supreme Court has been widely derided as
inappropriately "activist" by opponents of its decision in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). See, e.g., President George W. Bush,
Remarks at the 2004 Republican National Convention (Sept. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-2.html ("I support
the protection of marriage against activist judges. And I will continue to appoint
federal judges who know the difference between personal opinion and strict
interpretation of the law.").
240. See JOHN MAKDISI, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1-238 (2d ed. 2000) (introducing commonalities and differences of
some of the varying schools of jurisprudence); see also PETER SUBER, THE CASE OF
THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS: NINE NEW OPINIONS (1998) (reprinting Lon Fuller's
classic law review article offering six fictional judicial opinions representing
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the proper role of the courts generates methodological
pronouncements about what questions are and are not
appropriately within the judicial purview. It is a short distance
from awareness of the social implications of a case to a
methodological inquiry constituting the substantive determination
of a question before the court.
Of course some LGBT family law cases do pose straightforward
questions of judicial authority, making their methodological
inquiries unquestionably necessary. In Bacalod v. Superior Court, for
example, the California Court of Appeal was asked to order a
change in the recorded sex on the birth certificate of a plaintiff
who had been born in the Philippines and completed gender
reassignment in Canada. 41 California statutes establish procedures
for recognizing the change in gender of a person born within the
state, but the Bacalod court found no authority permitting it to
revise the birth certificate issued by a foreign jurisdiction. 42 Since
"it is not the role of this court to expand the statutory scheme to
accommodate the circumstances of this case," the opinion
suggested that Bacalod's concerns were "properly directed to the
Legislature. 243  Such statements, which are essentially the
substantive holdings of their decisions, intuitively make sense to
legal readers who understand the restraint that courts must show.
But when the limitations of courts' interpretive role are
invoked because of the policy debate surrounding the status of gay
families, the significance of the methodological inquiry becomes
more apparent, more controversial, and more stark. This can be
seen in Littleton v. Prange, the case in which a transsexual woman
brought a wrongful death suit against a doctor who treated her
husband.244 The Littleton court was careful to point out not only
that the case was one of first impression, but also that it involved
"important matters of public policy for the state of Texas. '2 45 The
policy question at issue in the case was to "determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of marriages involving
different philosophies of law, and adding new opinions to capture contemporary
strains of legal philosophy).
241. Bacalod v. Superior Court, No. B175091, 2005 WL 712316, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 30, 2005).
242. Id. at *2-3.
243. Id. at *3 n.5.
244. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. 1999).
245. Id. at 230.
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transsexuals." 246 Framed that way, it is not difficult to see why this
should be the work of the legislature rather than the judiciary.
It stands to reason, then, that throughout its decision, the
Littleton court indiscriminately cast the issue before it as biological,
sociological (even when those categories contradict each other)
and legislative, but not at all judicial.24 7 The opinion maintained
that "this court has no authority to fashion a new law on
transsexuals," suggesting that Littleton was a case about
"transsexuals" rather than about giving credit to the marriage
license that was issued to the couple in Kentucky, or about the
wrongful death of Littleton's husband.248  The court aligned the
questions before it with "metaphysical arguments... involving
desire and being, the essence of life and the power of mind over
physics," and defined Littleton's assertions about her marriage and
her claims against the doctor as belonging to "the misty fields of
sociological philosophy.",49 The court then found that "[m]atters
of the heart do not always fit neatly within the narrowly defined
perimeters of statutes. ' 250 After such pronouncements it is not hard
to conclude that determining Littleton to have legally altered her
gender would require the court to venture into the realm of
lawmaking.
Nonetheless, in disavowing its authority to decide in Littleton's
favor, the court cannot be said to have remained neutral in matters
of policy. After all, the Littleton decision does firmly settle some
rather debatable points. First, Christie Littleton is still legally male
in the State of Texas, and second, even if she is no longer a man,
she is a transsexual, which is not the same thing as a woman. 25 This
is significant because according to the court, it is up to the
legislature to decide whether transsexuals can qualify as lawful
spouses. 252 By deeming the case to be about the gender status of a
transsexual, Littleton's claim that as her husband's widow she is
entitled to sue for wrongful death suddenly exceeds the court's
246. Id.
247. Id. at 227, 230-31.
248. See id. at 230.
249. Id. at 231.
250. Id.
251. In an enumerated series of conclusions, the court states its most pivotal
finding baldly, and without citation: "Biologically a post-operative female
transsexual is still a male." Id. at 230. In this breathtakingly simple syllogism, the
court embraces the language and concept of transsexual gender identity and sex-
reassignment surgery, while soundly rejecting the viability of actual change in sex.
252. Id.
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interpretive responsibility. Despite its allusions to the legislative
prerogatives of metaphysics and sociology, though, the Littleton
court is not really sidestepping larger philosophical questions. Its
refusal to recognize Christie Littleton as a woman (something that
the court in M.T v. JT. 5 3 in New Jersey in 1976 had no trouble
doing) is a de facto policy decision. Since the court frames the
issues as gender status and judicial deference, it may
methodologically absolve itself from overstepping its authority, but
it can not fairly deny that its conclusion ripples the pond of cultural
debate over gender and marital status.
It is important to note, too, that like other interpretative or
rhetorical strategies a court may adopt, a methodological inquiry
regarding a specific question does not always lead to a
predetermined answer. However unimpeachable any particular
court's methodological determination of its proper role may seem,
there are likely to be alternative ways to define that same court's
authority. This can be seen in the numerous cases in which
comparable courts facing comparable questions have ended their
own methodological examinations with entirely divergent
conclusions. The Ohio and Indiana courts of appeals, for example,
grappled with second-parent adoption cases within a few years of
each other and ended up on opposite sides of the fence, even
though both courts followed very similar processes of examining
their own authority.
In the Ohio case, In re Adoption of Doe, the nonbiological
mother of a child sought to adopt her daughter without the
surrender of the parental rights of her partner, the child's
biological mother. 254 The lower court rejected the petition, and
Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed.255 The appellate court found
that adoption in Ohio is "a creature of statute. Therefore, the
general rule that issues not available at common law but subject to
statutory creation must be strictly construed must be applied."
256
This is a clear methodological move, defining the case as statutory
and delimiting the court's role to strictly applying the statute as
written. Since the statutes generally demanded the termination of
prior parental rights before a new parent of the same gender could
adopt a child, the court's hands were tied-it had to follow the
253. M.T.v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210-11 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
254. In reAdoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
255. Id. at 1071, 1073.
256. Id. at 1072.
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letter of the law, and accordingly deny the petition.57
The petitioner's assertion that the second-parent adoption was
in the child's best interests had no place in the proceedings,
258
according to the court. Since the best interests of the child
standard "pertains to the adoption process, not to the legal effects
of the adoption," arguing for the child's interests in order to
change the status of the parents is, in the words of the court,
putting "the cart before the horse" 2 59 Framed this way, the court's
decision is not really about the child at all, but about the legal
status of the parents, or, rather, what Ohio law has to say about who
qualifies as a parent.2
°
While one may or may not like the conclusion reached by the
Ohio court, it nonetheless seems to make sense. Adoption is a
statutory matter, the statute is quite clear about the termination of
parental rights in the case of adoption, and other issues do not
apply. But the opinion feels murkier when we consider that the
Indiana Court of Appeals, looking at a nearly identical case,
interpreted its obligations under its own statutes quite differently in
In re Adoption of M.M.G. C.2 6 ' There, a woman also petitioned for
second-parent adoption of the children she and her partner were
raising, and the lower court also denied the petition as not
specifically allowed under Indiana family law.' 2  But its own
257. Id. at 1073.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Unspoken in the opinion, but explicit in Judge John W. Wise's
concurrence to the decision, is the social policy element of the case. See id. (Wise,
J., concurring). Judge Wise argues that underlying the case is:
the legal reality that two individuals of the same sex cannot marry under
existing Ohio law and therefore, both cannot be spouses. Until such
time as the General Assembly of Ohio changes the law pertaining to
same-sex marriages or rewrites the adoption statutes to specifically allow
the requested legal relationship, I cannot interpret the existing adoption
statute as contemplating a spousal relationship between two individuals
of the same sex such as to create a stepparent relationship in a legal
context.
Id. What is interesting here is that although the concurrence does raise social
policy and legislative questions, the decision itself does not, instead leaning
exclusively on statutory construction for its argument.
261. 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
262. Id. at 269. The only difference between the two cases is that in this case
the children were adopted rather than born to the initial mother. Id. at 268. The
court makes this distinction, maintaining that its decision does not "reach the
question of whether a second-parent adoption would divest all rights of a
biological parent with respect to the child where the child's prospective adoptive
parent and the child's biological parent are not married to each other." Id. at 270.
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methodological examination led the Indiana court to reverse the
lower court's finding and remand the case for reconsideration of
the adoption.263
Like the court in Ohio, the Indiana court looked closely at the
adoption statutes to determine what course of action it should
take.2 " And as in Ohio, the statute did not provide any explicit
26guidance as to how to treat such a new issue. 65 Still further
following the Ohio pattern, the court consequently held that
Indiana statutes did not recognize the possibility that an unrelated
person would seek to adopt a child without divesting the initial
parent of her parental rights. 266 In Ohio, this absence of specific
permission for second-parent adoption was taken to mean that
none was allowed: no statute, no adoption. 7 The Indiana court
decided instead that it must look next to common law, i.e. to
questions purely within its own purview.2 68 Of course, this itself
raised questions since for most of American history, adoption lay
outside the stream of common law. 269 But a brief look at the history
of adoption in Indiana's jurisprudence demonstrated to the court's
satisfaction that the overriding concern in adoption has been the
best interests of the child.2 70 The court then concluded without
reservation that formalizing the children's legal relationship with
both of the parents who were raising them would be in their best
interest.2
71
This final foray into common law is a very different
methodology from that of the Ohio court. Turning to common law
removes any question about the court's competence to decide the
issue. Moreover it shifts the methodological focus from strict
construction to a more flexible way of understanding law, since, as
the court claims, " [t] he strength and genius of the common law lies
in its ability to adapt to the changing needs of the society it
governs. ' '272 In Indiana, the absence of statutory guidance, then,
However, methodologically, the court follows the same procedure as the Ohio
court.
263. Id. at 271.
264. Id. at 270.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See In reAdoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
268. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d at 270.
269. Id. (citing In re Perry, 148 N.E. 163, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d at 270 (quoting Brooks v.
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does not foreclose a judicial determination on the merits of the
273
adoption. On the contrary, it makes space for a broader, more
generous interpretation of the law, based upon the potential for
the "financial, spiritual, educational, and emotional well-being of
the child in a stable, supportive, and nurturing environment.
2 74
The larger question here is not how, but in what contexts these
two contrasting courts invoke their methodological inquiries. What
are the circumstances that lead courts to choose one approach over
another? In the main it seems that courts search for a solid
methodological foundation for their decisions when the issue
before them appears imbued with a social significance. The more
important, far-reaching, and potentially controversial their decision
seems, the more appropriate it might be to leave it to the political
process.
But even though all sides of an issue can use methodological
examination of their roles and responsibilities to frame or even
commend their positions, this strategy is not employed equally by
all sides. Courts are far more likely to discuss the parameters of
their power when they are asserting that they do not have authority
on a particular point, then when they conclude that they do. In
some ways this is self-evident. When a court takes its authority for
granted it does not need to proclaim its right to adjudicate a given
Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972)).
273. Nor does it necessarily open up that possibility either. In a similar
adoption case in Colorado, In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App.
1996), the petitioners claimed that because the statutes were silent about the
termination of parental rights in the case of a second-parent adoption, and
because previous decisions had determined that in ambiguous cases courts should
read statutes liberally, the court should read the adoption statute broadly. Id. at
492. The Colorado court disagreed, stating that "liberal construction does not
permit a court to rewrite the statute; instead, this principle may be used only to
uphold the beneficial intent of the General Assembly when the wording of the
statute creates a doubt." Id. Even when presented with the possibility of shaping
the statute in favor of the petitioners, the court tossed the responsibility of
decision-making back to the legislature in intent if not in action. By contrast, in a
NewJersey case, In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R, 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995), the statute itself commands that adoption law "be liberally
construed to the end that the best interests of children be promoted." Id. at 538
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-37 (1999)). For this court, the absence of an explicit
statutory prohibition on second-parent adoption, coupled with the mandate to
read the statute liberally, leads to the decision that "the stepparent exception to
the natural parent's termination of rights should not be read literally and
restrictively," and that the second mother should be awarded the rights of
adoption. Id. at 538-39.
274. In reAdoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d at 271.
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issue. The fact that the court comes to a decision is itself an
assertion of its authority to do so. However even this tacit and
unexamined assumption of authority in LGBT family cases is itself a
trace of an occluded authoritative moment. In the wake of fierce
political and cultural debate over queer family forms in general,
and gay marriage in particular, cases asking for legal recognition of
LGBT families almost inevitably raise methodological questions as
courts wrestle with the intersection of judicial, political, and social
spheres. Even silence about the methodological role of the court
can be interpreted as a strategic decision either to normalize queer
families or to suggest their utter marginality to pre-existing family
forms. 75  And if a case includes a dissent, an explicit
methodological inquiry in one part of the opinion makes the
absence of a corresponding analysis in the other seem quite
deliberate.276
All this is to say that courts are acutely conscious of the policy
implications of the decisions they make about queer families.
Whether they say so openly or not, this consciousness leads to a
closer, more explicit examination by the courts of their role in
determining the meaning of "family" as a social phenomenon and
as a legal structure. This brings us back to the question of how the
family relationships before the court are framed. As we have seen,
275. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Me. 2004) (holding that
the lesbian former partner of a biological mother was a de facto parent to the
child that the two had raised and could be considered for an award of parental
rights). The court's decision is grounded in equity and a consideration of the
child's best interests, and thus predicated almost entirely on factual conclusions.
Though the concurring opinion offers further support for the decision in Maine's
family law statutes, these legal interpretations were not incorporated in the court's
main opinion. It is difficult to read the opinions and fail to conclude that the
Supreme Judicial Court had deliberately focused on the facts of the case and
sidestepped any potential controversy over the statutory of common law bases for
finding there to be potentially two parents of the same gender.
276. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in T.B. v. L.tM., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa.
2001), for example, permitted a lesbian parent to sue for partial custody and
visitation of a child she had raised with her former partner, the child's biological
mother. Id. at 920. With almost no methodological inquiry, the majority
concluded that there was a common law basis to conclude that petitioner stood "in
loco parentis," and therefore had standing to proceed -with her petition. See id.
The dissent not only disagreed and found substantial statutory support for its
position, but determined that the majority opinion conflicted with "an express
legislative design," hence exceeding the authority of the court. Id. at 922 (Saylor,
J., dissenting). The methodological examination in the dissent makes the majority
opinion, which lacks a correlating examination, read quite differently than it
would if it stood on its own.
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a court's understanding of the closeness or distance between queer
family forms and traditional ones is integrally connected to that
court's understanding of the limits of its interpretive authority.
Courts can negotiate the intensity of social and political debate
over queer families by drawing close analogies to those already
legally recognized. In so doing, they essentially represent decisions
in favor of LGBT litigants as minor interpretive tinkering with
extant legal doctrine. Conversely, the courts can say that LGBT
families are a whole different animal from their heterosexual
counterparts, and use methodological arguments to conclude that
it is not appropriate to confer legitimate status on them through
common law.
Either way, it is quite common for these same courts to deny
the link between their legal holdings and the social phenomena
that generated the cases in the first place. Courts on both sides of
the divide frequently insist that the LGBT family law cases before
them are not about sexuality, the legality of gay marriage, or
whether queer people make good parents, but are solely about
some narrow question of legal interpretation. In Blanchflower, the
case in which the court concluded that a lesbian extramarital
relationship could not be defined as adulterous, the court insisted
that "this appeal is not about the status of homosexual relationships
in our society or the formal recognition of homosexual unions.
The narrow question before us is whether a homosexual sexual
relationship between a married person and another constitutes
adultery within the meaning of [the New Hampshire statute] .,277
Similarly, when several sets of lesbian and gay parents were
granted new Virginia birth certificates for children who had been
co-adopted in Washington, D.C. in Davenport v. Little-Bowser, the
majority sternly reprimanded the dissent that
it is important to state what this case is not about. There
was much discussion in the trial court, and some before
this Court, concerning homosexual marriage. This case is
about issuing birth certificates under the provisions of
Virginia law; it is not about homosexual marriage, nor is it
about "same-sex" relationships, nor is it about adoption
policy in Virginia.278
And again (although more concisely), the court granting the
lesbian couple's name change in In re Bicknell declared that "in
277. In reBlanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1011 (N.H. 2003).
278. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 369 (Va. 2005).
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spite of the unique circumstances involved, the only issue before us
is whether the appellants' request to change their surnames is
reasonable and proper under [the statute] .,279
Whether courts find for or against queer litigants, this anxiety
about whether they are dealing with legal or social issues (why can
they not be both?) permeates the decisions. The courts
aggressively, even defensively, insist upon the legal grounding of
their decisions. Yet despite this insistence, the rich variety of ways
different courts can discuss, define, and use their own interpretive
authority suggests that the realm of the "purely legal" is far-
reaching indeed. So we might ask a corollary question: What is it
that pushes courts towards a broader or a narrower interpretation
of family law, particularly when the broader analysis usually favors
queer families? Why does what is ostensibly the same
methodological process lead to such differing judicial opinions?
Ultimately, the answer seems to be not statutory but cultural.
That is to say, when courts believe that the social ramifications of
finding for queer litigants are too radical, they use methodological
explanations to support their unwillingness to venture into such
controversy. Conversely, a court that is comfortable with
broadening the definitions of family can offer simple justifications
for its authority to do so, or omit them entirely and proceed
directly to its reasoning. This may seem self-evident, but in fact it is
a crucial insight into the courts' interpretive workings. It
demonstrates that the issue in gay family cases is not simply
whether a court cleaves to or distances itself from a strict statutory
reading, or even whether the court is "conservative" or "liberal."
Rather, the courts' rulings have their source in a much more
amorphous grounding-their definition of their own authority and
the tangled intersection between redefining family forms and
judicial power. Meanwhile, it is no doubt true that when a court
claims the power to interpret statutes to permit recognition of
LGBT families it is implicitly arguing for its own authority in
shaping the American family. But it is equally true that when a
court maintains that such authority redounds to the legislature it is
also shaping the American family. The difference is that the second
court is shaping public policy by omission rather than by
commission. While the courts continue to insist that their
decisions are only about statutes and not about "same-sex
279. In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 847-48 (Ohio 2002).
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relationships," "gay marriage," "homosexual rights," and
"transsexuals," their declarations show even more clearly how
inseparable legal interpretation can be from social phenomena.
Ultimately, the methodological is intertwined with the cultural, the
analogical with the ideological, the statutory with the social, and
the precedential with the political.
V. CONCLUSION.
When courts maintain that they do not have the authority to
apply statutes to new definitions of family, they end up affirming
the status quo. In fact, that is exactly what such opinions mean to
do-whether through concern purely for the proper function of
the branches of government, out of political conviction, or from
some combination of the two-a court concluding that "this isn't
our job," says implicitly, "let's leave things the way they are unless
someone else wants to change them., 280 Meaning, of course, that
legally recognizing the family at issue will have to wait for a later
time, or another process. Intentional or not, the consequence of
such a determination by the courts is that queer families lose-
children, marriages, inheritances, even identities.
So when do courts wash their hands of such questions?
Obviously the unique legal schemes of the various states may make
such a conclusion more, or less necessary. Specific jurisdictions
may have distinctive precedents or accepted means of statutory
interpretation that push courts more or less strongly toward or
away from such a conclusion. But leaving aside for a moment
jurisdictional idiosyncrasies, the times when a court is most likely to
say that it does not have the authority to do what proponents of
LGBT families are asking are likely to be when the court is most
acutely conscious of what it perceives to be the sea change in social
policy that such recognition would entail.
In other words, the more the gay family is framed as being
280. Which may be unlikely given the popular support for gay families.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the fear of gay marriage was responsible for
substantial Republican victories in the 2004 elections, and an immediate backlash
of eleven state DOMAs enacted by popular vote. Commentators have criticized
the rather reductive conclusion that the gay marriage issue was the primary
explanation for the election results, but there is general agreement that the issue
is a galvanizing one for social conservatives. See Susan Ryan-Vollmar, The Blame
Game: Marriage Wins Didn't Cause DOMA Losses, BAY WINDOWS ONLINE, Nov. 11,
2004, http://www.baywindows.com (search for the article from Bay Windows
website).
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foreign, new, and carrying with it a huge social weight, the more
conscious the court is of the political controversy of what it is
doing, and the more questions are raised about whether the court
is empowered to render a decision. If a court believes that allowing
lesbians and gay men to be parents to children within a nuclear-
style family, rather than resembling the heterosexual family,
renders it more alien, then judges will shy away from what they see
as creating a new family form. However, if lesbian parents with
children, or a transsexual man and his wife, seem fairly
indistinguishable from their biologically gendered, heterosexual
counterparts, a court imagines itself as applying the law, not
constructing a new social category.
So the factual framing of the case becomes inextricably bound
up with its methodological reasoning. The way the courts see the
cases before them cannot be separated from the way they
understand their role in deciding these cases. These factors work
synergistically-the bigger the reach of the factual framing, the
more the question of authority is implicated, and the converse is
equally true. Deciding that Christie Littleton is "really" a man is
part and parcel of deciding that a court cannot rule on the issue of
"transsexual marriage," and vice versa. If the court were not
inclined to delegitimate transsexual gender identification, then the
question of "transsexual marriage" would not even emerge, since
Littleton would simply be a lawfully-certified widow petitioning to
sue her late husband's doctor. Similarly, the concept of
"transsexual marriage" raises the issue of possible marriage
structures outside the status quo, an issue that has been explicitly
addressed by various state DOMAs.
This, then, is what I mean by the term "authoritative moment."
It is a turning point in which a decision's substantive reasoning,
factual framing, and methodological inquiry meet.2 ' It may
sometimes be clearly marked in an opinion, and other times may
be an underlying predicate to the court's opinion, obscured as the
decision is written. It is my contention, however, that the
authoritative moment is not simply a signpost speeding the court
along its way, but can instead be the court's destination. It emerges
281. Because it is almost impossible to talk about such a concept spatially-
that is, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to locate it precisely in the text of the
opinion-I use a temporal metaphor to suggest that at some point these factors all
come together, even if the text of the opinion does not itself show us precisely
where that point is.
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when courts are engaged in defining their role in a given case.2 82 It
is the sum of the array of sub-determinations which must come
together before a court can know how to handle a new queer
family-legal, factual, and methodological. What in any given
decision may seem like throat clearing is actually a court's act of
orienting itself so that it can get down to the serious business of
weighing the facts and coming to a determination.
The authoritative moment is discernable in statements like this
one in Parentage of L.B, granting a non-biological non-adoptive
second parent the right to sue for custody and visitation of a child
she and her former partner planned and raised together: "In sum,
recognition of de facto parentage, in appropriate circumstances
such as those alleged in this case, is in accord with existing
Washington family law and reflects the evolving nature of families
in Washington. ' '283  Such a statement cannot exist without
simultaneous determinations that: 1) a two-mother household is
cognizable in Washington law; 2) such a family is analogizable to
already understood and legally sanctioned family forms; 3) even
though no statute or prior case law expressly permits recognizing a
parenting relationship in such circumstances, the fact that none
prohibits one permits or requires the court to determine whether
recognizing one in this case makes sense; and finally, 4) here,
under these facts, such a parenting relationship can be found. All
of these conclusions, intertwined, articulated explicitly or not, must
underlie the court's holding, so that it can be legitimately set forth
in the subsequent sentence.284
As a metaphorical, perhaps merely theoretical moment in time,
the complex set of analyses I am referring to may only rarely be
expressly spelled out in a given opinion. Perhaps the
interconnectedness of some of these issues will not even be
developed with full consciousness by the court. Nonetheless, this
authoritative moment is, at least for these queer family law
282. I have argued earlier that "recourse to the language of methodological
authority often defines the parameters of what a court believes an issue is about
(or wants to insist it is about)." Kris Franklin, The Rhetorics of Legal Authority:
Constructing Authoritativeness, the "Ellen Effect," and the Example of Sodomy Law, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 49, 101 (2001).
283. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 285 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
284. "Accordingly we hold that a common-law claim of de facto or
psychological parentage exists in Washington such that Carvin can petition for
shared parentage or visitation with L.B." Id.
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opinions, a crucial site of decision making even when it does not
represent itself as such. s"
In fact, a significant number of these decisions do not
ruminate upon procedural or jurisdictional issues, but rather take
for granted that they either are or are not qualified to rule on the
question at hand, often with little discussion and little or no
support. In the New York second-parent adoption case, Alison D. v.
Virginia M., for example, the court simply concludes that Section 70
of the Domestic Relations Law allows parents of children to seek
visitation after the dissolution of their relationships with the
children's custodians. Despite the dissent's searching
examination of the court's power to interpret Section 70 liberally,
the majority quite simply "decline[d] petitioner's invitation" to do
so. 28 7  No explanation needed; no further inquiry entertained.
However, such an assumption that potentially new questions in
family law are beyond the ken of the court has clear consequences
and is itself an authoritative choice. Bound up into it are notions
about what the statute means, how the petitioner's relationship to
the child can be understood, and how the law ought to operate.
Tied together, these considerations make up an unspoken
authoritative moment making possible, and comprehensible, the
court's rather abrupt conclusion.
This moment, whether developed and examined at length,
skimmed through with little reflection, or even seemingly taken for
granted, presages the court's analysis of the case because its
conceptualization of the issue at hand is informed by the
inextricable interweaving of the substantive law, analogical framing,
and sense of its own authority to intervene. The metaphor of the
285. In fact, when reading some of these opinions it is possible to discern the
outcome from methodological cues long before the court begins its substantive
analysis of the facts and law. When the Bicknell court announces early on that "in
spite of the unique circumstances involved, the only issue before us is whether the
appellants' request to change their surnames is reasonable and proper," there
seems little doubt that the court will find the question of gay marriage irrelevant
and accordingly permit the lesbian petitioners to change their surnames. In re
Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 847-48 (Ohio 2002). Less obviously methodological, but
no less telling, is the Littleton court's musing about whether gender is "fixed by our
Creator at birth." Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
Positioned as a question of divine plan, the court's conclusion that it ought not
involve itself in alteing the sex designated for the plaintiff at birth, id. at 230-31,
seems foreordained.
286. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
287. Id.
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braid takes on especial meaning here. In a braid, the twining of
the different strands in relation to each other constructs a fiber
much stronger and more resilient than a single thread. A court's
interweaving of inherited law, fact, and methodology fashions a
determination that is far more difficult to fray than simple
dependence upon precedent alone. At the very least, precedent is
never alone in these cases-it always depends upon some kind of
framing of the facts and statement of the court's authority in order
to determine whether queer families are legible within legal
frameworks.
The imagery in the braid analysis suggests that it is almost
impossible to look at one of these strands in isolation. Focusing on
one element's effect on a judicial opinion raises the question of
how another element is also in play, rendering the discussion
unidimensional and oversimplified. That is not to say that I am
arguing that politicized social forces are solely responsible for
shaping judicial decisions. Rather, I am arguing for the
simultaneity of the social, the legal, the methodological, the
factual, and the precedential, and it is this simultaneity that shapes
what courts do and how judges think. Certainly, queer family law is
inherently politicized, so the relationship between the judicial and
the political is particularly highlighted, since these cases push at
the boundaries of established statutory and common law.
I began this Article speculating about how one might map the
mind of the court. Of course, we cannot map the mind of any
court entirely. But if we can start to untangle the threads in the
judicial opinions and examine the shape, color, and texture of
each one individually, then at the very least we can begin to
understand how they are woven together. This understanding can
arm not just litigators but judges themselves with a better
vocabulary and a richer conceptual sense of the options available to
them in reviewing precedent, framing the facts, and defining their
authority. At best, judges will face the decision-making process with
more self-consciousness and more honesty about what it is they are
288. And just as strands of differing girths may be braided to one another, so,
too, can the varying analytical strands that I am discussing have differing weights
in any given opinion. Which explains why the weights of each strand may be at
least somewhat inversely related; where the analogical framing in a particular case
suggests that there is a long way to go to find in favor of the queer litigants, for
example, it is far more likely that a strong methodological analysis (and
consequent conclusion that the court ought not weigh in on the matter) will
resolve the issue.
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doing.
Thus, in many ways this analysis complicates the by-now
cliched distinction between "activist" and "conservative" judges,
since all judicial decisions reflect both political outlook and legal
structures; indeed, they do so inevitably and inextricably. The
rhetoric of 'judicial activism" obscures the ways in which all judges
deploy precedent, facts, and methodological inquiry in ways that
mirror or even amplify their sense of the social order, if only to
affirm the status quo.
